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Abstract
This paper examines quantitatively the e¤ects of R&D subsidy and government-nanced basic
research on U.S. economic growth and consumer welfare. To achieve this, we develop an endogenous
growth model which takes into account both public and private research investment, and the di¤erences
between basic and non-basic research. A calibrated version of the model is able to replicate some
important features of the U.S. economy over the period 1953-2009. Our model suggests that government
spending on basic research is an e¤ective policy instrument to promote economic growth. Subsidizing
private R&D, on the other hand, has no e¤ect on economic growth.
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1 Introduction
A central implication of modern growth theory is that long-term economic growth is mainly driven by
technological improvements. While certain improvements can be achieved through learning-by-doing
(Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986), most of the innovations we see today are the products of purposeful research
and development. Over the past several decades, the U.S. government has adopted various policies to spur
R&D investment and economic growth. In this study, we focus on two types of research policies, namely
tax incentives for private R&D and government spending on basic research.1 The goal is to evaluate
the e¤ects of these policies on U.S. economic growth and consumer welfare. To achieve this, we develop
an endogenous growth model with both public and private research investment. A calibrated version of
the model is able to replicate some important features of the U.S. economy over the period 1953-2009.
We then perform a series of counterfactual experiments to quantify the impact of research policies on
economic growth and consumer welfare.
The e¤ect of government policies on private R&D investment has long been a subject of interest
among growth theorists. Since the pioneering work of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), a substantial body of research has examined the determinants of private R&D
investment and its relation to economic growth.2 These so-called R&D-based growth models provide a
micro-founded framework for analyzing research policies. Most of the existing studies, however, focus
exclusively on the e¤ects of tax incentives (such as tax exemptions and tax credits) for private R&D and
overlook the importance of direct government spending on innovative activities.3 Since World War II, the
U.S. government has played a crucial role in funding these activities. Although the overall importance of
public R&D spending has declined since the 1960s, the government remains the most important source
of nancial support for one particular type of research, namely basic research.4
Basic research is one of the three major categories of research activities, the other two being applied
research and development.5 Basic research refers to studies that are solely intended to advance our
1For more information about the U.S. national innovation system and other research policies, see Mowery (1998) and
Shapira and Youtie (2010).
2For a detailed review of these studies, see Aghion and Howitt (2005) and Jones (2005).
3Examples include Grossman and Helpman (1991), Jones (1995), Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (1998, 2000), Young (1998),
Howitt (1999), and Impullitti (2010). Notable exceptions are Park (1998), Morales (2004), and Akcigit et al. (2012). The
latter group of studies will be discussed in greater detail later on.
4Between 1953 and 2009, the share of total R&D spending paid by the U.S. government has dropped from 54.7 percent
to 32.0 percent. Over the same time period, the government has paid more than 60 percent of all the expenses on basic
research, and its importance has not declined. See Section 2 for a more detailed discussion on these trends.
5This classication is adopted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States and the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For a formal denition of these research activities, see
<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/randdef/ fedgov.cfm> or the OECD Frascati Manual 2002, Section 4.2.
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knowledge on fundamental principles or fundamental aspects of phenomena (e.g., research on pure science
and pure mathematics). In particular, this type of research is not directed towards any specic application
or commercial goal. Applied research and development, on the other hand, refer to studies that are
targeted towards a specic practical goal or the actual production of new products. Thus, the objectives of
basic and non-basicresearch are fundamentally di¤erent. Empirical evidence shows that basic research
often provides the basis for non-basic research (Manseld, 1995; Narin et al. 1997), and it seems to
have a larger contribution to productivity growth than non-basic research (Manseld, 1980; Griliches,
1986). These two types of research also di¤er markedly in terms of funding source and performing sector.
Basic research is mostly funded by the government and performed outside of the private sector, whereas
applied research and development are mostly funded and performed by the private sector. For instance,
78.3 percent of all the expenses on basic research in 2009 were paid by the government (56.7 percent),
universities (10.8 percent) and other non-prot institutions (10.8 percent). The rest was paid by private
industries. On the contrary, private industries paid 71.1 percent of all the expenses on applied research and
development in 2009, while the government paid 26.2 percent.6 In terms of performing sector, 80.5 percent
of basic research was conducted by universities (53.3 percent), other non-prot institutions (12.2 percent),
federally funded research and development centers (7.7 percent), and federal agencies (7.2 percent). The
rest was performed by private industries. This contrasts sharply with the fact that 82.0 percent of applied
research and development was conducted in the private sector.7 These observations suggest that it is
important to distinguish between basic and non-basic research when analyzing the impact of public R&D
spending.
In this study, we develop an endogenous growth model which takes into account the major di¤erences
between basic and non-basic research, and the importance of direct government spending on basic re-
search. Our analysis also takes into account several empirical trends in the U.S. economy over the period
1953-2009, such as a rapid increase in the employment of researchers (relative to total employment), a
persistent decline in corporate income tax, the introduction of R&D tax credit in 1981, and other changes
in scal policies. In our model framework, basic research is targeted towards the creation of fundamental
knowledge, whereas non-basic research is directed at improving the quality of productive inputs. Fun-
damental knowledge is benecial to society because it can improve rm productivity and enhance the
6Most of the federal obligations for applied research and development are defense-oriented. For instance, the Department
of Defense and the defense programs under the National Nuclear Security Administration accounted for 68.6 percent of these
obligations in 2009. On the other hand, these federal agencies only accounted for 5.3 percent of all the federal obligations
for basic research in the same year.
7See Section 2 for more information about the patterns of R&D spending and how they change over time.
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e¢ ciency of non-basic research. This type of knowledge is freely available to all parties once it is dis-
covered. Since there is no private ownership of fundamental knowledge, no rm is willing to invest in
basic research. Hence, basic research is entirely funded by the government in our framework.8 On the
other hand, innovations created by non-basic research are protected by patents, which establish perpetual
monopoly rights over the sale of the improved products. The prot stream generated by these rights
provides the sole incentive for conducting non-basic research. In this study, we conne our attention to
non-basic research that is funded and conducted by prot-maximizing rms.9 Both basic and non-basic
research require the use of highly trained and specialized workers, or researchers. The supply of these
workers is exogenously given and inelastic at any given point of time. The assumption of inelastic supply
captures the fact that it requires a considerable amount of time to train someone to do research, hence the
total number of researchers cannot respond immediately to changes in market conditions. In each period,
an exogenous fraction of researchers is recruited by the government to conduct basic research. This in
turn determines the scale of public R&D spending and the growth rate of fundamental knowledge.
The accumulation of fundamental knowledge brought by basic research, and the continuous improve-
ment of input quality made possible by non-basic research are the two driving forces of technological ad-
vancement in our model. Similar to the neoclassical growth paradigm, the model developed here displays
a rich set of transitional dynamics which is jointly determined by capital accumulation and technological
improvements. In the theoretical analysis, we show that the model economy will eventually converge
to a unique long-run balanced-growth equilibrium that does not exhibit the scale e¤ect.10 In terms of
policy implications, our model suggests that government-nanced basic research is a strong impetus to
long-term economic growth. On the contrary, subsidizing private R&D investment (either in the form of
tax exemptions or tax credits) has no e¤ect on long-term economic growth. To further explore the growth
and welfare implications of these research policies, we construct a parameterized version of the model and
solve for the equilibrium time paths of all major economic variables using numerical methods. Under the
baseline parameterization, our model is able to replicate the patterns of R&D investment rate and the
8A detailed discussion on this assumption is provided in Section 2.
9As mentioned in footnote 6, most of the government spending on non-basic research is defense-oriented. As pointed out
by Mowery (2010), the unusual institutional setting of defense R&D programs and the specic nature of military inventions
make it di¢ cult to evaluate the impact of defense R&D on the entire economy. Consequently, much of our understanding
on the e¤ects of defense R&D is derived from case studies on particular industries. While these studies have raised some
interesting issues (such as the e¤ects of public procurement on private R&D, and the civilian innovations that are inspired
by defense R&D), we do not pursue them here, but rather focus on the e¤ects of government basic research spending.
10More precisely, our model predicts that long-term economic growth is independent of the size of population and the total
number of researchers. Similar to the models of Jones (1995), Segerstrom (1998), Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and Jones
and Williams (2000), our model predicts that long-term economic growth depends positively on the long-term population
growth rate. However, perpetual growth in per-capita variables is still possible even if the size of population or the total
number of researchers ceases to grow in the long run.
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increase in real per-worker GDP in the United States over the period 1953-2009.11 We then perform a
series of counterfactual experiments and welfare analyses in order to gauge the e¤ects of research policies.
There are four major ndings from the numerical analyses. First, subsidizing private R&D investment
has no e¤ect on technological progress and economic growth in both the short run and the long run. This
is because R&D subsidies can only stimulate the demand for innovative activities and the demand for
researchers, but have no e¤ect on the supply of researchers which is inelastic at any point of time. Hence,
subsidizing private R&D will only drive up the equilibrium wage rate for researchers without a¤ecting
the equilibrium quantity of labor input in innovative activities. Consequently, it has no e¤ect on techno-
logical progress and economic growth.12 This result is consistent with the empirical ndings reported by
Goolsbee (1998), and the ideas discussed in Romer (2001). Our second major nding is that the rapid
increase in the number of researchers (relative to total employment) is an important contributing factor
to U.S. economic growth. Under the baseline parameterization, our model suggests that 21.3 percent of
TFP growth and 25.8 percent of the growth in real per-worker output over the period 1953-2009 can be
attributed to this factor. Third, unlike R&D subsidies, direct government spending on basic research can
e¤ectively promote technological progress and economic growth. Our model suggests that 12.5 percent
of TFP growth and 14.3 percent of the growth in real per-worker output between 1953 and 2009 can be
attributed to the rising share of government basic research spending in total R&D expenditures.13 Our
results also suggest that about two-thirds of the long-term economic growth in the United States can be
attributed to the accumulation of fundamental knowledge. Because of these positive growth e¤ects, a per-
manent increase in government basic research spending can induce signicant welfare gains for consumers.
Finally, our results point to the signicance of general equilibrium e¤ects (or price e¤ects) when evaluating
the welfare implications of research policies. As we mentioned earlier, the e¤ects of R&D subsidies are
manifested solely on the equilibrium wage rate for researchers. As for government-nanced basic research,
a permanent increase in this type of spending not only accelerates the pace of technological progress, it
also drives up the equilibrium real interest rates. From an innovating rms perspective, higher interest
rates mean that the prot stream generated by an improved product is now discounted at higher rates.
This lowers the rms incentives to invest in non-basic research and their demand for researchers. Thus,
11Throughout this paper, R&D investment rate is dened as the share of total R&D spending in GDP.
12There are two reasons why this result does not appear in other studies, such as Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (1998) and
Impullitti (2010). First, these studies do not distinguish between researchers and non-researchers. Instead, they assume
that all workers are identical and freely mobile between research sector and production sector. Hence, the supply of labor
for research activities is not inelastic. Second, these studies typically use labor as the numeraire which means wage rate is
normalized to one in every period. Thus, R&D subsidies has no e¤ect on the equilibrium wage rate in their models.
13According to our measure, the share of government basic research spending in total R&D expenditures has increased
from 7.25 percent in 1953 to 13.86 percent in 2009. The time-series data of this share is shown in Figure 8.
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following a permanent increase in government basic research spending, the relative wage of researchers
to non-researchers declines initially before rising to the new (and higher) long-run level. Ignoring the
price e¤ects during the transition period will thus lead to an overestimation of the welfare gains from
government-nanced basic research.
Other studies that have explored the growth e¤ects of public R&D spending include Park (1998),
Morales (2004), and Akcigit et al. (2012). The rst two studies have generalized the model of Romer
(1990) to allow for government-nanced research. Both of them nd that government R&D policies can
have a signicant impact on long-term economic growth. These studies, however, do not explore the
quantitative implications of their models. The present study is closer in spirit to Akcigit et al. (2012) in
the sense that both have developed an endogenous growth model with basic and non-basic research, and
explored the quantitative implications of the model. However, the theoretical constructs and quantitative
analyses in these two studies are very di¤erent. In the model of Akcigit et al. (2012), private rms
can choose to operate in multiple industries and invest in both basic and applied research. Workers are
assumed to be homogeneous and freely mobile across industries and across sectors. In their theoretical
analysis, these authors focus on characterizing the variations of R&D spending across di¤erent types of
rms in the long-run stationary equilibrium, and their implications to long-term economic growth. In the
quantitative analysis, they estimate the long-run equilibrium solution of their model using rm-level data
for France over the period 2000-2006. In the current study, we focus on the temporal patterns of public
and private research spending, and analyze the impact of research policies in both the short run and
the long run. In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate our model using existing empirical estimates and
aggregate data for the United States over the past several decades, and quantify the e¤ects of research
policies that are specic to the United States.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical trends of R&D
spending and the total number of researchers in the United States. Section 3 describes the model economy.
Section 4 denes the equilibrium of the model and presents the main theoretical results. Section 5 explains
the choices of the baseline parameter values. Section 6 presents the numerical results. This is followed by
some concluding remarks in Section 7.
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2 Empirical Trends
In this section, we briey summarize the key patterns of R&D spending in the United States.14 Figure
1 shows the share of total R&D spending in U.S. GDP over the period 1953-2009. Between 1953 and
1964, R&D investment rate increased rapidly from 1.36 percent to 2.88 percent. Since then, it has been
maintained between two and three percent. Figure 2 shows the distribution of total R&D spending among
basic research, applied research and development. Over the entire sample period, development accounted
for more than 60 percent of total R&D spending in the United States, while applied research accounted
for another 20 percent. Despite the importance of non-basic research, the share of basic research spending
has been persistently increasing over the years. In 1953, basic research accounted for 8.9 percent of total
R&D spending. This increased to 19.0 percent in 2009.
Next, we turn to the importance of government and private industries in funding and performing these
research activities. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of basic research spending by funding source. Table 1
shows the distribution of basic research output (measured in terms of scientic publications) by performing
sector. Throughout the entire sample period, the U.S. government played a predominant role in funding
basic research. In particular, the government has funded about 70 percent of all the basic research
performed in academia, which is the primary contributor of scientic publications. Another important
observation from Figure 3 and Table 1 is that, while private industries have funded and performed a
substantial amount of basic research, they have produced only a small fraction of the output. This seems
to suggest that the amount private rms spend on basic research may not truly reect their importance
in the creation of fundamental knowledge. In a well-cited article on industrial R&D, Rosenberg (1990)
suggests two possible reasons why private rms would choose to invest in and maintain a basic research
capability: First, this type of capability is crucial for planning and evaluating non-basic research. Second,
it is also essential for understanding and exploiting the knowledge created by academic research.15 Thus,
according to this view, the main reason why private rms invest in basic research is to enhance their
performance in non-basic research, not to create fundamental knowledge. While it is di¢ cult to test
this hypothesis rigorously, it does seem to explain the empirical evidence mentioned above. Given the
relatively insignicant role of private industries in the creation of fundamental knowledge, we choose to
14Unless otherwise stated, all the data reported in this section were taken from National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2009
Data Update compiled by the NSF.
15The same author also pointed out that for industrial R&D the distinction between basic and non-basic research is
often not that clear. For instance, in the Survey of Industrial Research and Development conducted by the NSF, industrial
basic research is dened as the pursuit of new scientic knowledge or understanding that does not have specic immediate
commercial objectives, although it may be in elds of present or potential commercial interest.This denition can be found
in Research and Development in Industry: 200607, Appendix A.
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abstract away from basic research funded by private rms. This assumption helps keep the dynamics of
the model tractable and allows us to focus on the growth and welfare e¤ects of government basic research
spending.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of non-basic research spending by funding source. It is evident from
this diagram that the importance of government spending on applied research and development has been
declining since the 1960s. Figure 5 shows that this decline is coincident with the cutbacks in defense-
related and space-related R&D programs.
In the present study, we only take into account two types of research activities: (i) government-nanced
basic research, and (ii) applied research and development performed by private industries. Thus, when
comparing the model to data, we use the sum of R&D expenditures incurred by these activities as our
measure of total R&D spending (see Appendix C for more details). For the period 1953-2009, our measure
of total R&D spending represents 77.3 percent of the U.S. total. The implied R&D investment rates are
shown in Figure 1 (labelled as Our Measure).
Over the past several decades, the U.S. has also witnessed a rapid increase in the employment of
researchers. Figure 6 shows the growth factor of the number of full-time R&D scientists and engineers
employed by private industries and the growth factor of total employment in the United States.16 Between
1953 and 2009, the employment of private-sector researchers has increased by a factor of 8.75, while total
U.S. employment has increased by a factor of 2.29.
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics
The model economy is populated by two types of households, namely high-skilled (H) and low-skilled
(L) households. The number of each type of household is constant over time and is normalized to one.
Throughout this paper, an index s 2 fH;Lg is used to indicate household type. Each household comprises
a growing number of innitely-lived consumers. All consumers within the same household are identical.
Let Ns;t be the number of consumers in type-s household at time t: Let ns;t be the growth rate of type-s
household between time t and t + 1; so that Ns;t+1 = (1 + ns;t)Ns;t; for s 2 fH;Lg : The growth rates
16Data on full-time R&D scientists and engineers employed in the private sector are collected by the Business
Research and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS), conducted by the NSF. These data are available from
<http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/iris/ search_hist.cfm?indx=24>. Note that these data do not include academic researchers
and researchers employed by the government. Data on the employment of these researchers are relatively scarce. See Foot-
note 43 and Appendix C for more information. Data on the number of total employed workers (over age 16) are obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
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are exogenously given and changing over time in a deterministic manner.17 Total population at time t is
given by Nt = NH;t +NL;t; with N0 = 1: The share of high-skilled consumers in the population at time t
is denoted by t  NH;t=Nt:
3.2 Commodities
There are two types of commodities in this economy. First, there is a single nal good which can be used
for consumption and investment. The price of nal good is normalized to one in every period. Second,
there is a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods which can only be used to produce nal goods.
The set of intermediate goods is xed over time and is represented by [0; 1] : At the beginning of time 0; all
intermediate goods have the same initial quality which is normalized to one. The quality of these goods can
be improved over time, but the occurrence of quality improvement is stochastic and idiosyncratic across
products. Each improvement raises quality by a factor of  > 1: Hence, after j 2 f1; 2; :::g improvements,
the quality of the improved product is j : The probability of quality improvement is determined by a
number of factors, including R&D investment made by prot-maximizing rms. The details of this will
be explained later. Let Jt (!) be the number of improvements realized before time t for intermediate good
! 2 [0; 1] : Then there are Jt (!) + 1 di¤erent quality grades of the same intermediate good available at
time t: Throughout this section, we will use the pair (j; !) to indicate an intermediate good that is of
type ! and quality j : The price of intermediate good (j; !) at time t is denoted by pt (j; !) : Let Qt (!)
be the quality level of product (Jt (!) ; !) ; i.e.,
Qt (!) =   ::: | {z }
Jt(!) times
:
We will refer to this as the state-of-the-art quality for intermediate good !: The highest quality level
among all intermediate goods at time t is represented by qt  max fQt (!) : ! 2 [0; 1]g : We will refer to
this as the leading-edge quality at time t:
3.3 Final-Good Sector
In the nal-good sector, there is a continuum of identical rms which produce the same product. In each
period, each nal-good producer hires low-skilled workers and intermediate inputs, and produces output
17The terms high-skilled workersand researchersare used interchangeably throughout this paper. In the quantitative
analysis, we use the time-varying growth rates of NH;t and NL;t to account for the empirical patterns in Figure 6.
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according to
Yt = tMt L
1 
Y;t ; with  2 (0; 1) ; (1)
where Yt denotes the quantity of nal goods produced at time t, LY;t denotes the quantity of low-skilled
labor employed, Mt is a composite measure of intermediate inputs, and t is an economy-wide measure of
total factor productivity (TFP). The composite measureMt is constructed as follows: LetMt (j; !) be the
quantity of intermediate input (j; !) employed at time t: For each ! 2 [0; 1] ; dene a quality-augmented
measure of intermediate input, fMt (!) ; according to
fMt (!)  Jt(!)X
j=0
jMt (j; !) : (2)
This measure is dened as a weighted sum of all quality grades available for a given type of intermediate
input. It has two main properties. First, high-quality inputs are weighted more heavily than low-quality
ones, which means the former are more productive than the latter. Second, di¤erent quality grades of the
same input are treated as perfect substitutes in the production of nal goods. These quality-augmented
measures are then aggregated by a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator to form the composite measure Mt.
Formally, this is given by
Mt 
Z 1
0
hfMt (!)i d! 1 ; with  2 (0; 1) : (3)
The elasticity of substitution between any two types of intermediate inputs is given by 1= (1   ) :18
The productivity factor t is taken as exogenously given by the rms, and is determined by
t  Xt ; with  > 0; (4)
where Xt is the stock of fundamental knowledge created by basic research available at the beginning of
time t. In the model economy, basic research is entirely funded by the government and its outcomes are
freely accessible to all rms and consumers. In other words, fundamental knowledge is non-excludable.
It is also non-rivalrous, which means the use of fundamental knowledge by one rm does not reduce its
availability to others. Thus, all rms can benet from the existing stock of fundamental knowledge to
18Grossman and Helpman (1991), Segerstrom (1998), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), and Impullitti (2010) use the
same quality-augmented measure and Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator to dene a composite measure for a continuum of di¤erentiated
products. The main di¤erence is that, in their models, the di¢ erentiated products take the form of consumption goods rather
than intermediate inputs in production. In addition, these studies focus on the special case in which  = 0:
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the same extent. Since fundamental knowledge is a public good, we will also refer to it as public R&D
capital. Equation (4) states that public R&D capital is benecial to rm productivity. This assumption
is supported by the empirical ndings in Adams (1990), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), and Luintel and
Khan (2011).19 An isoelastic function is used to ensure the existence of balanced-growth equilibria. The
parameter  can be interpreted as the elasticity of TFP with respect to public R&D capital.
Since the production function in (1) is homogeneous of degree one, we can focus on the choices made
by a single, price-taking rm. Let wL;t be the wage rate for low-skilled worker at time t: The representative
rms problem is given by
max
LY;t;Mt()
8<:tMt L1 Y;t   wL;tLY;t  
Z 1
0
24Jt(!)X
j=1
pt (j; !)Mt (j; !)
35 d!
9=; ;
subject to (2) and (3), and the non-negativity constraints on intermediate inputs, i.e., Mt (j; !)  0 for
all (j; !) :20 The rst-order condition with respect to LY;t is
wL;t = (1  )t

Mt
LY;t

: (5)
The rst-order condition with respect to Mt (j; !) is
pt (j; !)  t

Mt
LY;t
 1 "fMt (!)
Mt
#  1
j ; (6)
which holds with equality if Mt (j; !) > 0:
The expression on the right-hand side of (6) is the marginal product of Mt (j; !) : The rst-order
condition in (6) has two main implications. First, if the price of input (j; !) is strictly greater than its
marginal product, then the representative rm will choose to have Mt (j; !) = 0: Second, for any given
type of intermediate input, say ! 2 [0; 1] ; the rm will only purchase those quality grades that have the
lowest quality-adjusted price, pt (j; !) =j : Let ept (!) be the lowest quality-adjusted price for intermediate
input ! at time t. Following Segerstrom (1998), we use the following assumption to break ties: If more
19Using data over the period 1956-1986, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) estimate the e¤ects of publicly nanced R&D capital
on the productivity of twelve U.S. manufacturing industries. Their results suggest that public R&D capital has signicant
cost-saving e¤ects in these industries. Using U.S. data over the period 1953-1980, Adams (1990) nd that knowledge created
by academic research is an important contributor to productivity growth. Luintel and Khan (2011) report similar results for
a group of ten OECD countries over the period 1970-2006.
20Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, it is never optimal for the rm to choose LY;t = 0: Hence, we can ignore the
non-negativity constraint on labor input. On the other hand, since di¤erent quality grades of the same intermediate input
are treated as perfect substitutes in (2), the rm may choose to have Mt (j; !) = 0 for some (j; !) : Thus, it is necessary to
take into account the non-negativity constraints on intermediate inputs.
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than one quality grades of the same type of intermediate input charge the same quality-adjusted price,
then the representative rm will only purchase the one with the highest quality. This ensures that only
one quality grade of each type of intermediate input will be used in every period.21 If the representative
rm chooses to use input (j; !) ; i.e., if Mt (j; !) > 0; then its demand function is given by
Mt (j; !) =
 
jPt
  
1  [pt (j; !)]
  1
1  Et; (7)
where Et denotes total expenditure on intermediate inputs at time t; i.e.,
Et 
Z 1
0
24Jt(!)X
j=1
pt (j; !)Mt (j; !)
35 d! = PtMt;
and Pt is a quality-adjusted price index dened by
Pt 
Z 1
0
[ept (!)]   1  d!  1   : (8)
A formal derivation of these expressions can be found in Appendix A.
3.4 Intermediate-Goods Sector
In the intermediate-goods sector, there is a continuum of innitely-lived rms. Each rm is the original
inventor of a single variety of intermediate good.22 We assume that each original inventor has signicant
technical and cost advantages in improving its own product over any potential competitors so that it is
the only researcher that attempts to improve its product.23 Successful quality improvement is rewarded
with a patent, which bestows perpetual monopoly right over the sale of the improved product. These
assumptions imply the following market structure of the intermediate-goods sector. All rms in this sector
are monopolistic in nature. Each monopolist specializes in the production and development of a single
intermediate good. In particular, all available quality grades of the same product are supplied by a single
monopolist.
Each monopolistic rm is made up of two divisions: the manufacturing division and the R&D division.
21This assumption also simplies the pricing decisions faced by the suppliers of these inputs. See footnote 27 for more
information.
22The original invention process is not considered in here.
23Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Section 7.3) have formally shown that in a patent race between an incumbent rm and
an outsider, if the former has signicant cost advantages in quality improvement research over the latter, then it will be able
to drive the outsider out of business and become the only researcher. We do not explicitly incorporate this type of patent
race in our model to avoid further complicating the analysis.
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The former is responsible for producing the product, and the latter is responsible for conducting quality
improvement research.
3.4.1 Production and R&D Technologies
All types of intermediate goods, regardless of quality and variety, can be produced by the same production
technology which uses physical capital and low-skilled labor as inputs. This technology is given by
YM;t = tK

t L
1 
M;t ; with  2 (0; 1) ; (9)
where YM;t denotes the quantity of intermediate goods produced at time t, Kt and LM;t denote the
quantities of physical capital and low-skilled labor employed. The productivity factor t is the same as
in (4). Similar to the nal-good producers, the monopolistic rms do not own the factors of production.
Thus, they have to hire low-skilled workers and rent physical capital from the competitive factor markets
in every period.
As for the R&D process, we assume that high-skilled labor is the only private input employed in
quality improvement research.24 Let M;t be the quantity of high-skilled labor employed by an individual
rm at time t; and let M;t be the average level of high-skilled labor input among all innovating rms in
the intermediate-goods sector. The probability of progressing from quality q to q is given by
t (q;M;t) 
#M;t
1 #
M;t

t (q)
; with # 2 (0; 1) ; (10)
where 
t (q) is a measure of R&D di¢ culty at time t. This measure is taken as exogenously given by
individual rms, and is determined by

t (q)   (q; qt)X %t ; with % > 0: (11)
The function  (q; qt) is assumed to be strictly positive, strictly increasing in the quality of the product
(q) ; and strictly decreasing in the leading-edge quality (qt) :
24 In the existing R&D-based growth models, it is typical to assume that labor is the only input employed in R&D activities.
See for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1992), Young (1995), Segerstrom (1998), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), Peretto
(1999), Aghion et al. (2001), Impullitti (2010) and Chu et al. (2012). Empirical evidence shows that labor compensation is
the largest component in private R&D expenditures. According to Dougherty et al. (2007, Table 3), labor costs account for
46.5 percent of total manufacturing R&D expenditures in the United States in 1997. The corresponding gures for France,
Germany and Japan are 52.8 percent, 61.7 percent and 42.7 percent, respectively. Materials and supplies accounted for less
than 20 percent of total manufacturing R&D spending in these countries. MacDonald (1973, Appendix Table V) reports
similar ndings for a group of ten OECD countries in 1963-1964.
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Equations (10) and (11) capture four fundamental aspects of quality improvement research. First, the
probability of successful quality improvement is strictly increasing in the rms own labor input. Since
# 2 (0; 1), this type of input is subject to diminishing marginal returns. The concavity assumption is
consistent with the empirical ndings in Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Hall et al. (1986). Second,
the di¢ culty of quality improvement research is strictly decreasing in the existing stock of fundamental
knowledge. In other words, fundamental knowledge is benecial to the e¢ ciency of private R&D. This
assumption is supported by the empirical ndings in Ja¤e (1989), Manseld (1995, 1998), Anselin et al.
(1997) and Zucker et al. (1998). Third, holding other things constant, high-quality products are more
di¢ cult to develop than low-quality ones. Thus, it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to move up the quality
ladder. This feature is captured by the assumption that  (q; qt) is strictly increasing in q for all qt:
Finally, research carried out by one rm will also create external benets for other innovating rms.25
This type of externality, or knowledge spillover, can occur in two ways: (i) when researchers communicate
and interact with each other, and (ii) when individual researchers learn from other peoples success (e.g.,
by reading the codied part of a patent or by reverse engineering). The expression 
1 #
M;t in (10) is intended
to capture the benets created by the rst channel. The main idea behind this expression is as follows:
As the size of the research community expands, more interactions among researchers will be available
and so the e¤ects of knowledge spillover will become larger. To ensure the existence of balanced-growth
equilibria, we assume that the function in (10) is homogeneous of degree one in M;t and M;t: The second
channel of knowledge spillover is captured by the assumption that  (q; qt) is strictly decreasing in qt for
all q: In words, this means all innovating rms can learn and benet from the leading-edge improvement,
so that an increase in qt will increase their research e¢ ciency.
26
The rms research outlay at time t is given by wH;tM;t; where wH;t is the wage rate for high-skilled
labor. These expenses are subject to two types of preferential tax treatment which we will explain later.
If an improved product is developed at time t, then the rm can start producing it as a monopoly at time
t+ 1:
In each period, each monopolistic rm has to make two groups of decisions. First, it has to decide
how much to produce and what price to charge for its product. Second, it has to decide how much to
25There is now a large body of empirical studies which conrm the existence and signicance of knowledge spillover across
rms. See, for instance, Ja¤e (1986), Audretsch and Feldman (1996, 2004) and references therein.
26The variable 
t () is similar in spirit to the R&D di¢ culty index dened in Segerstrom (1998), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) and Impullitti (2010). In the rst study, the di¢ culty index is determined by the past history of R&D investment in
each industry, and is thus di¤erent across industries. In Impullitti (2010), the di¢ culty index is identical for all industries
and directly proportional to the size of total population. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have considered the e¤ects of
trade liberalization under both specications. These studies, however, do not consider the e¤ects of fundamental knowledge
on the di¢ culty of private R&D.
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invest in quality improvement research. Since the monopolists do not own the factors of production, the
choices of physical capital and low-skilled labor in the production stage are static in nature and do not
interfere with the research investment decisions. Likewise, the choice of high-skilled labor input in the
research stage has no direct impact on the production process. Thus, the two groups of decisions can be
analyzed separately.
3.4.2 Production and Pricing Decisions
Since all nal-good producers use only one quality grade of each type of intermediate input in any period,
each intermediate-good producer will only supply one quality grade of its products.27 In particular, these
producers will always choose to produce the best quality grade of their products. To see this, suppose
the supplier of intermediate good ! 2 [0; 1] chooses to produce quality grade j at time t; for some
j 2 f0; 1; :::; Jt (!)g : Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the minimum cost of producing M  0
units of this product is Ct
 
M
  tM; where t is the unit cost of production. This cost is determined
by
t  1
t

Rt

 wL;t
1  
1 
; (12)
where Rt is the rental price of physical capital at time t: Low-skilled workers are freely mobile across
sectors, so there is only one wage rate (wL;t) for these workers. Since the production technology is
identical for all types of intermediate goods, so is the unit cost of production. The monopoly price of
product (j; !) can be obtained by solving
t (j; !)  max
pt(j;!)
f[pt (j; !)  t]Mt (j; !)g ;
where the market demand function Mt (j; !) is stated in (7).28 The optimal monopoly price involves a
proportional mark-up over the unit cost and is identical for all (j; !). Formally, this is given by
pt (j; !) = pt  t
 
; for all (j; !) : (13)
27This avoids the intricate issue of how a multiproduct monopolist would set the prices of its products, an issue that is
not directly related to the main objective of this study. For more discussion on this type of pricing problem, see Chu et al.
(2008) and references therein.
28Since there is a continuum of rms in the intermediate-goods sector, each rm is innitesimal when compared to the
entire sector. Thus, the aggregate price index Pt is treated as exogenously given when solving the monopoly pricing problem.
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The market demand function and the monopoly prot function are then given by
Mt (j; !) =
 
jPt
  
1  

t
 
  1
1  
Et;
t (j; !) = (1   )

 jPt
t
  
1  
Et:
Note that monopoly prots are strictly increasing in product quality
 
j

. Thus, the monopolist will only
produce the best quality grade Jt (!) in any period t. Note also that bothMt (Jt (!) ; !) and t (Jt (!) ; !)
depend on the index ! only indirectly through Jt (!) : Thus, for an intermediate input with state-of-the-
art quality Qt (!) = q; the market demand function and the monopoly prot function can be expressed
as
Mt (q) = (qPt)
 
1  

t
 
  1
1  
Et; (14)
t (q) = (1   )

 qPt
t
  
1  
Et: (15)
From this point onward, we will drop the index ! and identify each intermediate-good producer by the
state-of-the-art quality of its product.
3.4.3 Research Investment Decisions
Consider a monopolistic rm with state-of-the-art quality q at time t: The rms prots t (q) are subject
to corporate income tax. The tax rate at time t is denoted by p;t 2 (0; 1). When deciding how much to
invest in quality improvement research, the rm takes into account two types of preferential tax treatment
on private R&D expenses. First, these expenses are fully deductible from corporate income tax. Second,
these expenses are also eligible for additional subsidies, or R&D tax credits. The rate of subsidy at time
t is d;t 2 (0; 1) : Both the corporate income tax rate and the R&D subsidy rate are changing over time in
a deterministic manner, and they are fully anticipated by the rm. In each period, the rm distributes its
prots (net of taxes and research outlay) as dividends to its owners. Each monopolistic rm has a xed
number of shares outstanding in the equity market. The total number of shares issued by each rm is
constant over time and is normalized to one. Each of these shares is a claim to the rms future dividends.
The value of the rm is then given by the present discounted value of its future dividends. Formally, let
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t (q) be the amount of dividend distributed at time t; which is dened as
t (q)  (1  p;t) [t (q)  wH;tM;t] + d;twH;tM;t
= (1  p;t)t (q)  (1  p;t   d;t)wH;tM;t: (16)
Let Vt (q) be the value of a rm with state-of-the-art quality q at time t: The value function is dened
recursively as
Vt (q) = max
M;t

t (q) +
t (q;M;t)Vt+1 (q) + [1  t (q;M;t)]Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

; (17)
subject to (10) and (16). The expected future value of the rm is discounted using the market discount
rate (1 + rt+1)
 1 :
Since # 2 (0; 1), it is never optimal for the rm to choose M;t = 0. In other words, all intermediate-
good producers will invest in quality improvement research in every period. The rst-order condition for
M;t is given by
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;t = #

t (q)

M;t
M;t
# 1 Vt+1 (q)  Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

: (18)
Equation (18) states that optimality is achieved when the marginal cost of hiring high-skilled labor equals
its marginal benet. The marginal cost is the subsidized wage rate. The marginal benet is determined by
two factors: (i) the increase in success rate brought by an additional unit of high-skilled labor, and (ii) the
present value of the net gain from the improved product. Note that a successful improvement from quality
q to q not only creates some new value for the rm [i.e., Vt+1 (q)], but also destroys the continuation
value of the original product [i.e., Vt+1 (q)] which now becomes obsolete. Hence, the benet of successful
research is measured by the net gain in the rms future value. Holding other things constant, an increase
in either the corporate income tax rate (p;t) or the R&D tax credit (d;t) will lower the marginal cost of
hiring high-skilled labor and encourage the rms demand for research input.
3.5 Distribution of Product Quality
Since the timing and frequency of quality improvement is idiosyncratic across intermediate goods, a non-
degenerate distribution of product quality emerges in every period t  1: The distribution of product
quality is dened over the support Q  1; ; 2; :::	 : Consider those intermediate goods with state-of-
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the-art quality q 2 Q at the beginning of time t: The share of these goods is denoted by ft (q) 2 [0; 1] ;
with
P
q2Q ft (q) = 1 for all t: The initial distribution is degenerate and is denoted by f0 (1) = 1: For
future references, dene an aggregate quality index Qt according to
Qt =
8<:X
q2Q
ft (q) q
 
1  
9=;
1  
 
: (19)
The initial degenerate distribution then implies Q0 = 1 and q0 = 1:
The evolution of the quality distribution can be characterized as follows. Let M;t (q) be the optimal
quantity of high-skilled labor employed by an intermediate-good producer with state-of-the-art quality q
at time t: The probability of successful improvement is then given by bt (q)  t [q;M;t (q)] : Starting
from the initial condition f0 (1) = 1; the quality distribution changes over time according to
ft+1 (q) = bt (q) ft (q) + h1  bt (q)i ft (q) ; (20)
for all q 2 1; ; 2; :::	, and
ft+1 (1) =
h
1  bt (1)i ft (1) : (21)
At time t + 1; the set of intermediate goods with state-of-the-art quality q is the combination of two
groups. First, among those with state-of-the-art quality q at time t; a fraction bt (q) of them will be
upgraded to q at time t + 1: The size of this group is given by bt (q) ft (q) : Second, among those with
state-of-the-art quality q at time t; a fraction
h
1  bt (q)i of them will fail to improve and remain at
the same quality level. The size of this group is given by
h
1  bt (q)i ft (q) : Equation (20) states that
ft+1 (q) is given by the sum of these two groups. Equation (21) states that the set of intermediate goods
with q = 1 are those who fail to improve in every period.
Note that, in every period t; there is always a strictly positive fraction of rms with leading-edge
quality qt that succeed in improving their products. Thus, the leading-edge quality level will evolve
according to qt+1 = qt with probability one.
3.6 Basic Research
In the model economy, a continuum of basic research projects is available in every period. Each project
is indexed by a positive scalar z which indicates its quality. The set of research projects available at time
t is uniformly distributed over the range [0; zt] : The upper boundary zt represents the most advanced
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project at time t: This value is assumed to be changing over time in a deterministic manner. The specics
of this will be explained later.
In each period, each member of the high-skilled household draws a single basic research project from
the uniform distribution. The draws are independent over time and across individuals. After observing
z; a high-skilled consumer then seeks outside funding in order to develop the project. If the project
is unfunded, then the consumer will work as a researcher in the intermediate-goods sector (the private
sector). Even if outside funding is available, the consumer can still decide whether or not to proceed with
the project. If he chooses not to proceed, then again he will work in the private sector. If he chooses to
proceed, then he will have to invest his own time endowment (which is normalized to one) on the project.
Similar to quality improvement research, basic research only requires high-skilled labor as input and its
success is uncertain. If a project of quality z is successfully developed at time t, then it will create  (z)Xt
units of new fundamental knowledge. The function  : [0; zt]! R+ is continuous and strictly increasing,
which means high-quality projects contribute more to the growth rate of fundamental knowledge than
low-quality ones. No new knowledge is created if the project fails.
The probability of successfully developing a type-z project at time t is given by
x;t (z) =
1

x;t (z)
: (22)
In the above expression, the numerator represents individual researchers own labor input (which is one),
and the denominator indicates the di¢ culty of developing a type-z project at time t: The di¢ culty index
is determined by

x;t (z)  x (z)= (Qt)X %t ; with % > 0: (23)
Both x : R+ ! R++ and = : R+ ! R+ are continuous, strictly increasing functions.
Equation (23) captures three important aspects of basic research. First, the di¢ culty of basic research
in general is strictly decreasing in the available stock of fundamental knowledge. This captures the idea
that past discoveries of basic research are benecial to the productivity of current research.29 Second,
high-quality projects are more di¢ cult to develop than low-quality ones. This assumption is captured
by the strictly increasing function x () : Third, as the economy becomes more technologically advanced,
basic research projects become more di¢ cult for researchers to develop individually. This assumption
29This mechanism is often referred to as the intertemporal knowledge spillover e¤ect. Note that Xt enters into (11) and
(23) in the same way. This assumption is needed to ensure the existence of balanced-growth equilibria.
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is captured by the strictly increasing function = (Qt) ; where Qt is used as a measure of technological
development. The main ideas behind this assumption are as follows: A basic research project can be
viewed as a collection of tasks. As technology advances, more sophisticated and specialized techniques
for conducting basic research are available and adopted. As a result, the tasks involved in basic research
projects also become more specialized. This makes it more di¢ cult for a single researcher to complete all
the tasks in these projects. This hypothesis provides a potential explanation for the increasing prevalence
of collaboration and teamwork among scientists.30 In particular, it is consistent with the fact that scientic
collaboration is more common in elds that require complex instrumentation (or big science).31
The function = (Qt) represents one of two channels through which innovations brought by quality
improvement research can feedback into basic research. The second channel is built upon the idea that
major breakthroughs in non-basic research or technology often open up new areas of scientic studies.32
To capture this mechanism in the most parsimonious manner, we set zt = qt for all t: In words, this means
a leading-edge improvement in technology will also broaden the range of scientic research.33 Under this
specication, the upper bound zt will increase deterministically over time according to zt+1 = zt:
Next, we turn to the supply side of basic research funding. As we mentioned earlier, due to the public-
good nature of fundamental knowledge, no rm is willing to invest in basic research. Consequently, basic
research projects are solely funded by the government.34 The amount and allocation of basic research
funding is determined by a national research agency. In each period, the government agency chooses a
set of research projects so as to maximize the growth rate of fundamental knowledge subject to a policy
constraint. Let Dt  [0; zt] be a non-empty set of research projects funded by the government. For those
research projects with quality z 2 Dt; a fraction x;t (z) of them will succeed and create  (z)Xt units of
30For the empirical evidence on the rising trend of scientic collaboration, see Beaver and Rosen (1979) and Stephan (1996,
Table 4). Other possible explanations for this phenomenon have been examined by Katz and Martin (1997) and Jones (2009).
31For instance, Katz and Martin (1997) and Klein (2005) point out that many projects in high-energy physics, astronomy,
oceanography, and life sciences (e.g., the Human Genome Project) require sophisticated and specialized equipments such
as particle accelerators, observatories, ocean research vessels, and supercomputers. Consequently, research in these areas
typically require collaborations between specialists in di¤erent elds. In other words, it is very di¢ cult (if not impossible)
for a single researcher to perform all the tasks involved in these research projects.
32See, for instance, Rosenberg (1990, p.169) for some specic examples.
33Our theoretical analysis can be easily extended to accomodate a more general relationship between qt and zt: For instance,
one can assume that zt is strictly increasing in qt and {t; where {t represents other exogenous factors that can also a¤ect
the range of scientic research. The assumption that qt and zt share the same exogenous growth rate is not essential for our
major results.
34This also explains why high-skilled workers will not self-nance any unfunded projects: Since there is no market for
fundamental knowledge, the gain from a self-nanced project is zero, but the opportunity cost (wH;t) is always strictly
positive.
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public R&D capital. The total quantity of public R&D capital produced by the set Dt is given by
1
zt
Z
Dt
x;t (z)  (z)Xtdz =

1
zt
Z
Dt
e (z) dzNH;tX%+1t [= (Qt)] 1 ;
where e (z)   (z) =x (z) : The growth of fundamental knowledge is determined by
Xt+1
Xt
= 1 +

1
zt
Z
Dt
e (z) dzNH;tX%t [= (Qt)] 1 ; (24)
with X0 > 0 given. In the above expression, the depreciation rate of fundamental knowledge is assumed
to be zero.
The national research agency is assumed to follow two types of policies when deciding the size and
allocation of basic research funding. First, in order to ensure participation in basic research, the wage
rate for basic researchers must be no less than the market wage rate for high-skilled workers. Specically,
the government agency will o¤er all basic researchers a wage rate twH;t; with t  1; regardless of the
outcome of their research. If t = 1; then high-skilled workers will be indi¤erent between working in the
public and the private sector. We assume that, in this case, workers with basic research projects that are
qualied for funding will still choose to work in the public sector. Second, the government agency has
a targeted scale of basic research in every period. Specically, this means the government will recruit a
fraction $t 2 (0; 1) of high-skilled workers into basic research in every period t. This gives rise to a policy
constraint on the choice of Dt; which is

1
zt
Z
Dt
dz

NH;t = $tNH;t ) 1
zt
Z
Dt
dz = $t: (25)
The amount of government basic research spending (Gx;t) is then determined by Gx;t = $ttwH;tNH;t:
In each period, the government agencys problem is to choose a set of research projects Dt  [0; zt]
so as to maximize the growth of public R&D capital in (24) subject to the policy constraint in (25).35
The solution of this problem depends crucially on the shape of e (z)   (z) =x (z) : Note that this
function combines two characteristics of basic research projects: (i) the potential contribution of each
project as captured by  () ; and (ii) the di¢ culty of research project x () which directly a¤ects the
rate of success. Since high-quality projects are also more di¢ cult to develop, the shape of e () cannot
35The sole purpose of this maximization problem is to provide a theoretical foundation for the results in Proposition 1.
Alternatively, one can directly assume that the results in Proposition 1 are valid without solving this problem. This will
not a¤ect the subsequent analysis. In the present study, we do not consider the socially optimal level of government basic
research spending.
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be determined a priori. In the current study, we focus on the case in which e () is a strictly increasing
function, which means the expected contribution of a basic research project is strictly increasing in its
quality. This assumption is desirable because it gives rise to an intuitive solution which can be obtained
in a straightforward way. More specically, under this assumption, the optimal set of research projects is
given by Dt = [dt; zt] ; with dt  (1 $t) zt > 0: This result is summarized in Proposition 1.36 All proofs
can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Suppose $t 2 (0; 1) for all t  0 and e () is a strictly increasing function. Then the
optimal set of research projects in any time t is given by Dt = [dt; zt] ; where dt  (1 $t) zt > 0:
Proposition 1 has two main implications. First, the government will nance those research projects
with the highest quality in every period. Second, by recruiting a larger share of high-skilled workers into
basic research (i.e., increasing the value of $t), the government can support a wider range of research
projects which in turn enhances the growth rate of fundamental knowledge. In the following analyses,
we will adopt the specic form e (z)  z'; with ' > 0: The expected value of e (z) over the optimal set
Dt = [dt; zt] is then given by
1
zt
Z
Dt
e (z) dz = ($t) z't ;
where  ($t) 
h
1  (1 $t)1+'
i
= (1 + ') is strictly increasing in $t: The maximized growth factor of
public R&D capital is now given by
Xt+1
Xt
= 1 +  ($t) z
'
t NH;tX
%
t [= (Qt)] 1 : (26)
3.7 Households
Both high-skilled and low-skilled households have preferences over consumption sequences which can be
represented by
1X
t=0
tNs;tU (cs;t) ; for s 2 fH;Lg ; (27)
36Two remarks about Proposition 1 are in order. First, similar results can be obtained under a more general distribution of
basic research projects. Suppose the distribution of z at time t is given by Ht (z) ; where Ht : [0; zt]! [0; 1] is a continuous,
strictly increasing function. If e () is strictly increasing, then the optimal set of research projects at time t is given by
Dt = [dt; zt] ; where dt  H 1t (1 $t) > 0: The proof of this statement is available from the author upon request. Second,
suppose Ht () is a uniform distribution and e () is strictly decreasing. Then the optimal set of research projects at time t
is given by Dt = [0; dt] ; where dt = $tzt > 0: This result can be obtained by using the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 1. In this case, the government agency will always nance those projects with the lowest quality, which seems
unintuitive. Hence, we do not consider the case when e () is strictly decreasing.
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where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, U () is the (per-period) utility function, and cs;t is the
consumption of a type-s consumer at time t: The utility function is given by
U (c) =
c1 
1   ; with  > 0:
All consumers are endowed with one unit of time in every period. Low-skilled consumers supply their
time endowment inelastically to the production of nal goods and intermediate goods. Their before-tax
labor income at time t is wL;t: As for high-skilled consumers, if an individual draws a qualied basic
research project (i.e., dt  z  zt); then he will work as a basic researcher and receive twH;t as before-tax
labor income. Otherwise, he will work as a private-sector researcher and receive wH;t: Thus, if t > 1
for some t; then the high-skilled workers will face idiosyncratic uncertainty in labor income. We assume
that the high-skilled household is able to provide complete consumption insurance for its members when
necessary. Under this arrangement, all members of the high-skilled household will pool their incomes
together and consume the same level of consumption cH;t in every period. The average before-tax wage
rate for high-skilled worker is denoted by ewH;t  [1 + (t   1)$t]wH;t:
The two households can save and borrow through the nancial intermediaries in every period. Let
As;t be the asset holdings of type-s household at time t: The before-tax rate of return on these assets is rt:
Households also receive lump-sum transfers from the government in every period. The amount of transfers
received by type-s household at time t is s;t: Labor income and interest income at time t are taxed at
rates w;t 2 (0; 1) and a;t 2 (0; 1) ; respectively. The tax rate on private consumption expenditures is
denoted by  c;t > 0: The budget constraint for type-s household at time t is given by
(1 +  c;t)Ns;tcs;t +As;t+1  As;t = (1  w;t) ews;tNs;t + (1  a;t) rtAs;t +s;t; (28)
where ewL;t = wL;t:
Taking prices and government policies as given, the households problem is to choose a sequence of
consumption and asset holdings so as to maximize the discounted lifetime utility in (27), subject to the
sequential budget constraint in (28), the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
T!1
8<:
"
TY
t=1
(1 + (1  a;t) rt)
# 1
As;T+1
9=;  0;
and the initial condition: As;0  0: The solution of the households problem is completely characterized
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by the sequential budget constraint, the Euler equation for consumption
cs;t+1
cs;t
=



1 +  c;t
1 +  c;t+1

[1 + (1  a;t+1) rt+1]
 1

; (29)
and the transversality condition
lim
T!1
"
T
 
c s;T
1 +  c;T
!
As;T+1
#
= 0: (30)
Conditions (29) and (30) together imply that the no-Ponzi-game condition is satised.
3.8 Government Expenditures and Financing
The government in this economy performs a number of functions. These include (i) providing lump-sum
transfers to the households, (ii) maintaining the patent system, (iii) subsidizing private R&D expenses,
and (iv) determining the size and allocation of basic research funding. In each period, the government
incurs three types of expenses, namely (i) transfer payments, (ii) subsidy on private R&D expenses, and
(iii) basic research spending. These expenses are nanced by four types of taxes, which are taxes on labor
income, interest income, corporate income and private consumption. Formally, the total amount of tax
revenue collected at time t is determined by
Tt  w;t
24 X
s2fH;Lg
Ns;t ews;t
35+ a;t
24 X
s2fH;Lg
rtAs;t
35+  c;t
24 X
s2fH;Lg
Ns;tcs;t
35
+p;t
8<:X
q2Q
ft (q) [t (q)  wH;tM;t (q)]
9=; ;
where
P
q2Q ft (q)t (q) is the aggregate level of corporate income at time t, and wH;t
P
q2Q ft (q) M;t (q)
is the aggregate level of private R&D investment. The government is required to maintain a balanced
budget in every period, so that total government expenses and total tax revenues must be equal at all
times. Formally, this means
X
s2fH;Lg
s;t + d;twH;t
24X
q2Q
ft (q) M;t (q)
35+Gx;t = Tt; for all t  0: (31)
All policy instruments, except government transfers, are treated as exogenously given. These include
all the tax rates and R&D subsidy rates, f c;t; w;t; a;t; p;t; d;tg1t=0 ; the shares of high-skilled workers
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employed by the government, f$tg1t=0, and the markup over market wage rate for basic researchers,
ftg1t=0 : The set of exogenous policy instruments is summarized byG  f c;t; w;t; a;t; p;t; d;t; $t; tg1t=0 :
The values of fH;t;L;tg1t=0 are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
3.9 Financial Sector
In the nancial sector, there is a large number of identical, innitely-lived, risk-neutral nancial inter-
mediaries or banks. The banks are the owners of physical capital and equity issued by the rms in the
intermediate-goods sector. Let Kt be the quantity of physical capital owned by the banks at the beginning
of time t: In each period, the banks rent out the stock of physical capital to the producers of intermediate
goods at rate Rt: The e¤ective rate of return from physical capital is given by rt = Rt ; where  2 (0; 1)
is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
As for equity, we assume that only banks have access to the equity market. Thus, in equilibrium, all
the equity shares issued by the monopolistic rms are held by the banks. Let St (q) be the shares of rms
with state-of-the-art quality q that are owned by the banks at time t; and Pt (q) be the price of each
share. The value of all the shares owned by the banks at time t is given by
P
q2Q ft (q)Pt (q)St (q) :37
The amount of dividend income generated by this portfolio is
P
q2Q ft (q)t (q)St (q) :
In each period, the banks receive rental incomes from physical capital, and dividend incomes from
equity shares. They also solicit deposits from the households in each period. The interest rate paid on
these deposits is also rt: All the proceeds received by the banks are used to nance their asset holdings
in the next period and o¤set their deposit liabilities. Since anyone can set up a nancial intermediary at
zero cost, the banksprots are driven to zero in every period. The zero-prot condition for the entire
nancial sector is given by
Kt+1 +
X
q2Q
ft (q)Pt (q)St+1 (q) + (1 + rt)
X
s2fH;Lg
As;t
= (1 + rt)Kt +
X
q2Q
ft (q) [Pt (q) + t (q)]St (q) +
X
s2fH;Lg
As;t+1: (32)
37Since there is a large number of rms in the intermediate-goods sector, the idiosyncratic risks regarding the success and
failure of quality improvement research faced by each monopolist is completely diversied in this portfolio. Thus, there is no
aggregate uncertainty in this model.
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4 Equilibrium
4.1 Denition
Given a set of exogenous policy instruments G; an equilibrium of this economy consists of (i) sequences
of allocations fcH;t; cL;t; AH;t; AL;tg1t=0 for the two households, (ii) sequences of factor inputs employed by
the representative nal-good producer fLY;t;Mt ()g1t=0 ; where eachMt () is a real-valued function dened
on Q; (iii) sequences of functions fLM;t () ;Kt () ;M;t () ; Vt () ;t ()g1t=0 dened on Q which specify
the intermediate-good producersinput demands, equity value and dividend payments; (iv) sequences of
policy variables and public R&D capital fGx;t; dt; Xtg1t=0 ; (v) sequences of assets owned by the banks
Kt;St ()
	1
t=0
; where each St () is a real-valued function dened on Q; (vi) a sequence of success rates
for private R&D,
nbt ()o1
t=0
; where bt : Q ! [0; 1] for all t; and a sequence of quality distributions
fft ()g1t=0 ; where ft : Q ! [0; 1] for all t; and (vii) sequences of prices fwL;t; wH;t; Rt; rt; pt;Pt ()g1t=0 ;
where Pt : Q ! R+ for all t; such that
(a) Given prices and government policies, fcs;t; As;tg1t=0 solves type-s households problem.
(b) Given prices, fLY;t;Mt ()g1t=0 solves the nal-good producers problem in every period.
(c) Given factor prices and government policies, fLM;t () ;Kt () ;M;t () ; Vt () ;t () ; ptg1t=0 solves the
monopolistsproblems in the intermediate-goods sector.
(d) Public R&D spending is determined by Gx;t = $ttwH;tNH;t in every period. Public R&D capital
accumulates according to (26) with Dt = [dt; zt] and dt  (1 $t) zt for all t: The governments
budget constraint in (31) is satised in every period.
(e) The zero-prot condition for the nancial sector holds in every period.
(g) The distribution of product quality evolves according to (20) and (21) in every period.
(h) All markets clear in every period, so that for all t  0;
LY;t +
X
q2Q
ft (q)LM;t (q) = NL;t; (33)
M;t 
X
q2Q
ft (q) M;t (q) = (1 $t)NH;t; (34)
X
q2Q
ft (q)Kt (q) = Kt; (35)
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St (q) = 1; for all q 2 Q. (36)
Equations (33)-(35) state that in equilibrium the supply and demand for low-skilled labor, private-
sector researchers and physical capital are equated in every period. Equation (36) states the market-
clearing condition for equity.
4.2 Analysis
In this section, we will present and discuss some important features of an equilibrium in this model. A
formal derivation of these results can be found in Appendix A. In equilibrium, aggregate output in every
period t  0 is determined by
Yt = eAKt (	tNL;t)1  ; (37)
where  2 (0; 1) and eA > 0 is a constant. The variable 	t is dened as
	t  X
(1+)
1 
t Q

1 
t : (38)
Equation (37) is obtained after combining the production technologies in the nal-good sector and the
intermediate-goods sector. Similar to the neoclassical production function, the aggregate production
function in (37) exhibits diminishing returns with respect to physical capital. In the standard neoclassical
growth model, the diminishing marginal product of capital is counteracted by an exogenous growth
in labor-augmenting technology. Without this type of technological progress, per-capita output will
eventually cease to grow. In the current framework, 	t plays the same role as labor-augmenting technology
in the neoclassical framework. The source of growth in our model, however, is endogenously determined.
In particular, it is driven by the accumulation of fundamental knowledge created by basic research and
the continuous improvement in productive inputs made possible by non-basic research. Formally, the
growth factor of 	t can be expressed as
	t+1
	t
=

Xt+1
Xt
 (1+)
1 

Qt+1
Qt
 
1 
: (39)
The accumulation of fundamental knowledge is determined by (26). The growth rate of Qt is deter-
mined by the dynamics of the quality distribution fft (q) : q 2 Qg, which is in turn determined by the
optimal quantity of input employed in quality improvement research M;t () ; and the value of the im-
27
proved products Vt () : Both fVt ()g1t=0 and fM;t ()g1t=0 are sequences of unknown functions that need
to be determined in equilibrium. In general, it is very di¢ cult to analyze a non-stationary equilibrium
with sequences of unknown functions. For this reason, we seek conditions under which exact analytical
solutions for Vt () and M;t () are available. These conditions are stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose  (q; qt) =  (qt) q
# 
1  for all q 2 Q, where  : Q ! R+ is a strictly decreasing
function. Then a solution for Vt () and M;t () is
Vt (q) =  tq
 
1  ; and M;t (q) = (1 $t)NH;t

q
Qt
  
1  
;
where  t > 0 is an unknown coe¢ cient. The values of f tg1t=0 are determined by the dynamic equation
 t+1
1 + rt+1
=
 t   (1  p;t) (1   )EtQ
   
1  
t
1  # (1  #) (1 $t)


 
1    1

[ (qt)]
 1NH;tX
%
t Q
  # 
1  
t
: (40)
The results in Proposition 2 are extremely useful in simplifying the equilibrium analysis. Instead of
solving for two sequences of innite-dimensional objects (the unknown functions), now we only need to
determine a sequence of real numbers f tg1t=0 : Note that the analytical solution for Vt () and M;t () are
both directly proportional to q
 
1  in every period t  0: This property is intuitive because, in equilibrium,
the monopolistsinput demand functions, LM;t (q) and Kt (q) ; and prot function t (q) ; are all directly
proportional to q
 
1  in every period.
Using the results in Proposition 2, we can show that Qt will evolve over time according to
Qt+1
Qt
=

1 +
1
 (qt)


 
1    1

(1 $t)NH;tX%t Q
  # 
1  
t
 1  
 
; (41)
with initial value Q0 = 1:38 Equation (41) states that the growth rate of aggregate quality increases with
an increase in (i) the stock of fundamental knowledge, (ii) the number of high-skilled workers available
for private R&D, (iii) the size of quality improvement ; and (iv) the leading-edge quality qt: The growth
rate of Qt is also inversely related to its own level. Notice that the equilibrium dynamics of Qt are not
a¤ected by the corporate income tax rate (p;t) nor the R&D subsidy rate (d;t) : This follows from the
fact that both the equilibrium quantity of labor input employed in quality improvement research [i.e.,
38 In the equilibrium analysis, there is no need to keep track of the dynamics of ft () : This is because the distribution of
product quality will a¤ect the aggregate variables only through the aggregate quality index Qt: In other words, this index
serves as a su¢ cient statistic for the quality distribution. Hence, it su¢ ce to keep track of the dynamics of Qt:
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(1 $t)NH;t] and the distribution of this input [as captured by M;t ()] are independent of these policy
instruments. The equilibrium dynamics of Qt and Xt are now completely characterized by (26) and (41).
Once the values of fQt; Xtg1t=0 are determined, we can derive the values of f	tg1t=0 using (38).
In equilibrium, the economy-wide resources constraint in period t is given by
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt = eAKt (	tNL;t)1 
= AtK

t (	tNt)
1  ;
where At  eA (1  t)1  : The second line is obtained by using NL;t = (1  t)Nt: The notation Ct P
s2fH;LgNs;tcs;t represents aggregate consumption at time t: The Euler equation in (29) states that the
growth rates of cH;t and cL;t are identical in every period. Thus, there exists a positive real number 
such that cH;t = cL;t for all t  0: The value of  is endogenously determined in equilibrium (see
Appendix A for more details). Based on this observation, we can express aggregate consumption as
Ct =

NH;t
Nt
cH;t
cL;t
+
NL;t
Nt

NtcL;t = [1 + (
   1) t]NtcL;t:
The growth of aggregate consumption is then determined by
Ct+1
Ct
=

1 + (   1) t+1
1 + (   1) t

Nt+1
Nt



1 +  c;t
1 +  c;t+1

[1 + (1  a;t+1) rt+1]
 1

:
Note that changes in the composition of the labor force (as captured by t) and the tax rate on consumption
will also a¤ect the growth rate of aggregate consumption.
To characterize the transition paths in this model, we formulate a dynamical system in two transformed
variables: bct  Ct= (	tNt) and bkt  Kt= (	tNt) : This system is given by
bkt+1 = 	t+1
	t
 1Nt+1
Nt
 1 h
Atbkt + (1  )bkt   bcti ; (42)
bct+1bct =

	t+1
	t
 1 1 + (   1) t+1
1 + (   1) t



1 +  c;t
1 +  c;t+1

[1 + (1  a;t+1) rt+1]
 1

; (43)
where rt+1 =  At+1bk 1t+1   : The value of bk0 > 0 is exogenously given, whereas bc0 is endogenously
determined as in the standard neoclassical growth model.
29
4.3 Long-Run Balanced-Growth Equilibrium
In this study, we are interested in both the long-run and short-run e¤ects of research policies. In order
to dene a long-run balanced-growth equilibrium, all model parameters (including the population growth
rates and the exogenous policy instruments) must be time-invariant in the long run. The following
assumption is used to ensure this.
Assumption S There exists an integer T  > 0 such that for all t  T ; nH;t = nL;t = n > 0;
 i;t = 

i 2 (0; 1) for i 2 fw; a; c; p; dg ; $t = $ 2 (0; 1) ; and t =   1:
Under this assumption, the size of the two households will grow at the same constant rate from period
T  onward.39 As a result, the share of high-skilled consumers in the population t and the coe¢ cient
At in the aggregate production function will remain constant after period T ; i.e., t =  and At = A
for all t  T : Given Assumption S, a long-run balanced-growth equilibrium is an equilibrium that
satises two additional properties: (i) the growth rates of Qt and Xt are constant over time, and (ii) the
transformed variables bct and bkt are constant over time. In the remainder of this section, we rst establish
the existence, uniqueness and stability of long-run balanced-growth equilibrium. We then discuss the
factors that determine long-term economic growth.
4.3.1 Existence, Uniqueness and Stability
Obviously, a balanced-growth equilibrium (if exists) will only emerge after period T : Thus, we will focus
on the dynamics of the economy from period T  onward, taking as given the values of bkt; Qt and Xt at
t = T : The transitional dynamics can be separated into two parts. First, the time paths of Qt and Xt
are completely determined by
Xt+1
Xt
= 1 +  ($) z't NH;tX
%
t [= (Qt)] 1 ;
Qt+1
Qt
=

1 +
1
 (qt)


 
1    1

(1 $)NH;tX%t Q
  # 
1  
t
 1  
 
;
with QT  > 0 and XT  > 0 given. We will refer to this as the subsystem for Qt and Xt: Once the values
of fQt; Xtg1t=T  are determined, we can construct a unique sequence f	tg1t=T  using (38). The values of
39 If the size of the two households grow at di¤erent constant rates in the long run, then the population share of one group
will eventually diminish to zero.
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nbct;bkt+1o1
t=T 
are then determined by
bkt+1 = 	t+1
	t
 1
(1 + n) 1
h
Abkt + (1  )bkt   bcti ;
bct+1bct =

	t+1
	t
 1 n

h
1 + (1  a)

 Abk 1t+1   io 1 ;
under a given value of bkT  > 0: We will refer to this as the subsystem for bct and bkt: Note that this is a
non-autonomous system as it depends on the time-varying growth factor of 	t which is independent ofbct and bkt.
A solution to the subsystem for Qt and Xt is called a balanced-growth path (BGP) if the growth
rates of these variables are constant over time. A BGP is called globally stable if it exhibits the following
property: Starting from any positive values of XT  and QT  ; any solution to the subsystem will eventually
converge to the BGP. If the subsystem for Qt and Xt is globally stable, then the growth rates of Qt and
Xt (and hence 	t) will converge to some constants when t is su¢ ciently large. Let  be the long-term
growth rate of 	t: As the growth rate of 	t approaches ; the subsystem for bct and bkt will converge to
an autonomous system, bkt+1 = Abkt + (1  )bkt   bct
(1 + ) (1 + n)
;
bct+1bct = 
1

1 + 
h
1 + (1  a)

 Abk 1t+1   i 1 :
Note that this autonomous system is essentially the same as the one in the standard neoclassical growth
model. Thus, we know that it has a unique non-trivial steady state
bc;bk which is saddle-path stable. If
the subsystem for Qt and Xt has a unique globally stable BGP, then the long-run growth rate  is unique
and the model economy will eventually converge to a unique long-run balanced-growth equilibrium. Our
next proposition provides a set of conditions under which the subsystem for Qt and Xt has a unique
globally stable BGP.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption S is satised. Suppose % < #; = (Qt)  =Q
# 
1  
t ; and  (qt)  q 't ;
where = > 0 and  > 0 are two arbitrary constants. Then the subsystem for Qt and Xt has a unique
globally stable balanced-growth path.
Both = and  are arbitrary constants that have no signicance for our subsequent analyses, hence we
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set them equal to one. Along the unique globally stable BGP, we have
Xt+1
Xt
= 1 +  ($) eX; (44)
Qt+1
Qt
=
h
1 +


 
1    1

(1 $) eXi 1   ; (45)
where eX is the long-run stationary value of the transformed variable eXt  z't NH;tX%t Q  # 1  t : In the proof
of Proposition 3, we show that this transformed variable plays a key role in characterizing the subsystem
for Qt and Xt: The value of eX is uniquely determined by
' (1 + n)
h
1 +  ($) eXi% = h1 +   1    1 (1 $) eXi# : (46)
Substituting (44)-(46) into (39) gives
	t+1
	t
= 1 +  = (1 + n)ea1 ea2 h1 +  ($) eXiea3 ; (47)
with
ea1 = (1   )
(1  ) # > 0; ea2 = 'ea1 > 0; and ea3 = # (1 + ) + (1   )%(1  ) # > 0:
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, all per-capita variables will grow at the same constant rate  in every
period, and all major aggregate variables, such as

Yt; Ct;Et; Gx;t;Kt
	
; will grow by the same constant
factor (1 + n) (1 + ) : What remains is to ensure that the transversality condition in the households
problem is satised. This can be achieved by imposing some mild additional conditions.40 Our existence
and uniqueness results are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Suppose the conditions in Proposition 3 are satised. In addition, suppose  (1 + n) < 1
and   1: Then there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in which all per-capita variables grow
at the same rate  > 0 in every period.
40The transversality condition is satised if  (1 + )1  (1 + n) < 1: This condition also ensures that households
lifetime utility is nite in the long-run equilibrium. Since  > 0; this condition is satised if  (1 + n) < 1 and   1: The
assumption  (1 + n) < 1 is commonly used in models with population growth. The assumption   1 is commonly used in
quantitative macroeconomic studies.
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4.3.2 Determinants of Long-Term Economic Growth
As we mentioned earlier, long-term economic growth in this model is driven by the accumulation of funda-
mental knowledge and the continuous improvement of input quality. These two processes are determined
by factors such as the long-term population growth rate (n) ; the share of high-skilled workers partici-
pating in basic research ($) ; and the size of quality improvement () : The e¤ects of these factors are
made clear in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose the conditions in Proposition 4 are satised. Then the following results hold.
(i) An increase in n will increase the long-term growth rate of Qt and Xt:
(ii) An increase in $ will increase the long-term growth rate of Qt and Xt:
(iii) An increase in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on the long-term growth rate of Qt and Xt:
The intuitions behind these results are as follows. First, an increase in n means that the total supply
of researchers will grow at a faster rate in the long run. This increases the equilibrium quantity of labor
input in both basic and non-basic research, and thereby raises the growth rate of fundamental knowledge
and input quality. Second, by recruiting a larger fraction of researchers into basic research, the government
can support a wider range of research projects and promote the accumulation of fundamental knowledge.
This e¤ect is captured by the strictly increasing function  ($) : Such an increase also means that fewer
high-skilled workers will be available for quality improvement research. Holding other things constant,
this lowers the long-term growth rate of Qt relative to Xt and raises the value of eX: The increase in both
 ($) and eX then leads to a higher long-term growth rate of Xt. As for quality improvement research,
our result suggests that the increase in eX will counteract the decline in (1 $) so that an increase in
$ will also raise the long-term growth rate of Qt: Finally, an increase in  will generate two opposing
e¤ects on eX: On one hand, such an increase will speed up the long-term growth rate of Qt (relative to
that of Xt) and lead to a reduction in eX: On the other hand, an increase in  means that the frontiers
of science and technology (as captured by zt and qt) will advance at a faster pace. This will in turn raise
the value of eX: Thus, the overall e¤ect on eX is ambiguous. The long-run growth e¤ects of n and $
are summarized in Corollary 6, which follows immediately from Proposition 5.
Corollary 6 Suppose the conditions in Proposition 4 are satised. Then the long-term growth rate 
depends positively on the long-term population growth rate (n) and the share of high-skilled workers
participating in basic research ($) :
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Our model has three other important predictions regarding long-term economic growth. The rst
one concerns the so-called scale e¤ect (i.e., the e¤ect of population size on long-term economic growth).
Unlike the models of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992), our
model predicts that long-term economic growth is independent of the size of population. Similar to the
models of Jones (1995, 2002), Segerstrom (1998), Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and Jones and Williams
(2000), our model predicts that long-term economic growth depends positively on the population growth
rate. This, however, does not mean that population growth is indispensable for economic growth. Our
next proposition shows that perpetual growth in per-capita variables is still possible even when there is
no population growth in the long run.41 In this case, perpetual growth is sustained by the continuous
advancement of the frontiers of science and technology.
Proposition 7 Suppose the conditions in Proposition 4 are satised. Then the long-term growth rate 
is strictly positive even when there is no population growth in the long run, i.e., n = 0:
Second, our model suggests that neither corporate income tax
 
p

nor R&D subsidy (d) has any
e¤ect on the long-term growth of Qt and Xt: Consequently, providing tax incentives for private R&D
has no e¤ect on long-term economic growth. Other theoretical studies, such as Jones (1995), Segerstrom
(1998) and Young (1998), also make the same prediction.
Third, our model predicts that both the patent-researcher ratio and the patent-R&D ratio are decreas-
ing over time in the long-run balanced-growth equilibrium. This follows from the facts that both the num-
ber of researchers and the amount of total R&D spending are growing at some positive rates in the long-
run equilibrium, while the total number of patents granted in each period [given by
P
q2Q ft (q) bt (q) =
(1 $) eX] is time-invariant. Hence, the patent-researcher ratio and the patent-R&D ratio are both
decreasing over time. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Kortum (1993) and
Segerstrom (1998).
5 Calibration
The main purpose of the numerical analysis is to quantify the e¤ects of R&D subsidies and government
basic research spending based on the model developed above. To this end, we rst construct a parame-
terized version of the model and show that it is able to replicate certain features of the U.S. economy over
the period 1953-2009. Our benchmark economy is constructed as follows. First, the model is calibrated
41This is not true in the models of Jones (1995, 2002), Segerstrom (1998), Howitt (1999) and Jones and Williams (2000).
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so that it matches the actual capital-output ratio and R&D investment rate in 1953. Then, we input the
actual time series data on employment growth rates and various policy variables over the period 1953-
2009, and solve for the equilibrium time paths of all major economic variables. Finally, we impose the
assumption that all model parameters are constant from 2009 onward, and compute the unique long-run
equilibrium.42 Since the length of a period in the model is one year and the initial period is 1953, we set
T  = 56: Our benchmark model is able to generate patterns of R&D investment and economic growth
that are similar to those observed in the United States. We then perform a number of counterfactual
experiments and welfare analyses in order to determine the e¤ects of research policies. In this section, we
explain the rationale behind our choices of the baseline parameter values. All the numerical results are
presented in Section 6.
In the benchmark scenario, all the parameters listed in Table 2 are assumed to be time-invariant. Most
of these parameter values are chosen based on actual data or existing empirical estimates. Others are
calibrated so that the model can match a number of real-world statistics. The details of this procedure
are explained below.
5.1 Parameter Values Based on Empirical Evidence
Households In the present study, high-skilled workers correspond to those researchers who are engaged
in government-nanced basic research and non-basic research performed in the private sector. Thus, the
values of fnH;t; tgT

t=0 should match the annual growth rates of the employment of these researchers, and
their share in total U.S. employment over the period 1953-2009. Existing data on these values, however,
are very limited.43 Thus, we have to develop our own proxies for these values. The details of this procedure
are described in Appendix C. Regarding the share of researchers in total employment, our estimates show
that this share has increased from 0.79 percent in 1953 to 2.97 percent in 2009. Since high-skilled workers
only account for a small fraction of total U.S. employment, we equate the values of fnL;tgT

t=0 to the annual
growth rates of total U.S. employment. Our estimates also show that most of the researchers in the United
States are employed in the private sector. Hence, we equate the values of fnH;tgT

t=0 to the growth rates of
employment of R&D scientists and engineers in the private sector. These two sets of values thus capture
the employment growth patterns depicted in Figure 6. The long-run population growth rate (n) is set
42This computation procedure is similar to the one adopted in Chen et al. (2006).
43There are two major limitations in existing data sources. First, consistent time series data on the number of researchers
employed in di¤erent sectors (industry, academia and government) are not available before the 1990s. Second, the number
of researchers engaged in di¤erent types of research (basic, applied and development) are also not available in the existing
data sets.
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to 1.50 percent, which matches the average annual growth rate of total employment between 1953 and
2009. Once we impose the restriction nH;t = nL;t = n for all t  T ; the population share of high-skilled
workers (t) will remain constant at its 2009 value which is 2.97 percent (based on our estimates).
As for household preferences, the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution () is set equal to
two. This falls within the range of estimates obtained by several empirical studies.44 It also falls within
the range of values that are commonly used in quantitative studies (which is between one and two). The
value of  is determined by the calibration procedure described in Section 5.2.
Production Four parameters appear in the production functions of nal good and intermediate goods,
namely f;  ; ; g. Given the Cobb-Douglas specication in (1), the parameter  represents the ratio
between expenditures on intermediate inputs and the value of nal goods. For the period 1987-2009, the
average value of this ratio is 0.7348 in the U.S. data.45 Hence, we set  = 0:7348: As shown in (13), the
parameter  captures the extent of markup over the marginal cost of producing intermediate inputs. In
the baseline parameterization, we set  = 0:9091 which implies a ten percent markup over the marginal
cost. This value falls within the range of estimates obtained by Norrbin (1993) and Basu and Fernald
(1997).46 The value of  corresponds to the elasticity of TFP with respect to public R&D capital. Using
(4) and (12), we can show that   is also the elasticity of unit cost (t) with respect to public R&D
capital. Empirical estimates of these elasticities are relatively scarce. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) nd
that the cost elasticities of public R&D capital for twelve U.S. industries range from -0.009 to -0.056. In a
recent study, Luintel and Khan (2011) estimate that the elasticity of TFP with respect to basic knowledge
stock is 0.149. In the baseline parameterization, we set  = 0:10 which falls between these estimates. In
the sensitivity analysis, we will examine the e¤ects of changing  and  on the benchmark results. The
value of  is chosen based on the calibration procedure described in Section 5.2.
44Using time series data on aggregate consumption in the United States, Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) estimate that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is about 0.40, which implies  = 2:50: Using data from the Consumption
Expenditure Survey, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) estimates that the EIS for bondholders is about 0.80 (which means  = 1:25)
and that for stockholders is about 0.40, whereas Parker and Preston (2005) estimate that the EIS for U.S. households in
general is about 0.61 (which means  = 1:64): Our choice of  thus falls within this range of estimates.
45To compute this value, we rst collect annual data on intermediate input expenditures from the GDP-by-industry accounts
available on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website. We then compute the ratio between these expenditures and
U.S. GDP for each year in the period 1987-2009. The average value over this period is 0.7348. Data on intermediate input
expenditures for all industries are not available prior 1987.
46Using data on twenty-one U.S. industries over the period 1950-1984, Norrbin (1993) estimates that the average markup
in these industries is about ve to fteen percent. Using data over a similar time period, Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate
that the returns to scale of production in the U.S. manufacturing sector is about 1.09 [see their Table 1 Panel (A)]. Based
on a pure prot rate of three percent, this implies a 12.4 percent markup in the manufacturing sector. For more discussion
on this calculation, see Basu and Fernald (1997, p.253).
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Quality Improvement Research Two parameters are involved in the quality improvement research
process. The rst one, #; captures the degree of diminishing returns in private R&D. More specically,
this parameter can be interpreted as the elasticity of private R&D output with respect to the rms own
input in the research process. The second parameter, %; captures the strength of knowledge spillovers
from basic research to quality improvement research. This parameter can be interpreted as the elasticity
of private R&D output with respect to public R&D capital. In the existing empirical literature, private
R&D output is typically measured by the number of patents generated by individual rms within a certain
time period. Hall et al. (1986) estimate that the long-run elasticity of corporate patent with respect to
rmsown R&D investment is about 0.39 to 0.66, depending on the choice of estimation model. Blundell
et al. (2002) report an estimate of about 0.50 for the same long-run elasticity. Ja¤e (1989) examines
the e¤ects of both industrial R&D spending and university R&D spending on corporate patents. For
industrial R&D spending, the estimated elasticity ranges from 0.6 to 0.9. For university R&D spending,
the estimated elasticity ranges from 0.04 to 0.28. Based on these ndings, we use # = 0:50 and % = 0:20
as our benchmark values.
Government Policies When constructing the benchmark economy, we take into account changes in a
number of policy variables. These include the tax rates on incomes and consumption, fw;t; a;t;  c;t; p;tgT

t=0 ;
and the policy instruments that are related to research activities, fd;t; $t; tgT

t=0 : For the tax rates on
labor income (w;t), we use the time series of overall marginal income tax rate reported in Barro and
Redlick (2011, Table 1). This overall tax rate is the sum of federal income tax, state income tax and
Social Security tax in the United States. For the tax rate on interest income (a;t) ; we use the same time
series but exclude the Social Security tax which is a payroll tax. Since the data reported in Barro and
Redlick (2011) only cover up to the year 2006, we assume that these two tax rates are constant from 2006
onward. The long-run tax rates w and a are 35.3 percent and 26.0 percent, respectively. The tax rates
on private consumption expenditures ( c;t) are approximated using data from the National Income and
Product Accounts.47 The long-run tax rate c is 4.29 percent, which is the value in 2009. The corporate
income tax rates fp;tgT

t=0 are chosen based on the statutory tax brackets and rates listed in Statistics of
Income (SOI) Historical Table 24. These values are depicted in Figure 7. The U.S. corporate income tax
rate has been declining throughout the sample period. The most signicant development is the reduction
47First, we obtain annual data on total sales taxes collected by state and local governments over the period 1953-2009.
Then, we compute the ratio between these tax revenues and total private consumption expenditures for each year in this
period. The resulting values are used as our proxies for the consumption tax rates.
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in 1987 brought by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The long-run tax rate p is set equal to 35 percent,
which is the tax rate for the highest corporate income tax bracket in 2009.
As for R&D policies, we assume that government-employed basic researchers receive the same wage
rate as private-sector researchers, so that t = 1 for all t  0: Under this assumption, $t coincides with
the share of government basic research spending in our measure of total R&D expenditures. Thus, we
use the actual time series data on this share as the values of f$tgT

t=0 : The inputted values are shown
in Figure 8. The long-run value $ is 13.86 percent, which is the value in 2009. Finally, the values of
fd;tgT

t=0 are computed using the method described in Bloom et al. (2002). The details of this procedure
are reported in Appendix C. The time series of the combined subsidy rate for private R&D (i.e., the sum
of p;t and d;t) is shown in Figure 7. Note that there are two major changes in R&D tax credit, one in
1981 and the other in 1990. The long-run R&D tax credit (d) is 12.22 percent, which equals the value
in the last year of our sample.
5.2 Calibrated Parameters
Seven parameters remain undetermined up to this point. These include households subjective discount
factor ; the depreciation rate of physical capital ; the size of quality improvement ; one parameter in
the production function of intermediate goods ; one parameter in the basic research process '; the initial
value of physical capital per e¤ective unit of labor bk0; and the initial value of public R&D capital X0: The
rst ve parameters are chosen so that the models unique long-run balanced-growth equilibrium matches
ve long-run statistics. The two initial values are chosen (under the calibrated values of the rst ve
parameters) so that the benchmark economy can match two statistics in 1953. These targeted statistics
are summarized in Table 3.
We begin with the ve target statistics for the long-run equilibrium. The rst target is the average
annual growth rate of real per-worker GDP in the United States over the period 1953-2009, which is 1.56
percent. The second target is the share of labor income in U.S. GDP over the same time period, which
is 0.5342.48 The third target is the before-tax rate of return for physical capital. Using the procedure
described in Cooley and Prescott (1995), we nd that the average rate of return over the period 1953-2009
48This value is computed using data on compensation of employees and proprietors income over the period 1953-2009.
We assume that the share of labor income in proprietorsincome is identical to that of the entire economy, so that
Labors share of income =
Compensation of Employees
GDP - ProprietorsIncome
:
The same procedure is also used in Gomme and Rupert (2007, Section 4.2).
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is 8 percent (see Appendix C for more details). The fourth target is the average value of the capital-
output ratio over the period 1953-2009, which is 2.4272. To compute this value, we use the sum of private
xed assets and the end-of-year stock of private inventories as our measure of aggregate physical capital.
Our fth target is intended to capture the long-run level of R&D investment rate in the United States.
As shown in Figure 1, R&D investment rate has been uctuating signicantly during the 1960s and the
1970s, but has been stabilized since 1983. For this reason, we use the average value of R&D investment
rate over the period 1983-2009 as our target statistic. The value is 2.06 percent.49
After the value of f; ; ; ; 'g are determined, we then choose the value of bk0 and X0 so that the
model can match (i) the capital-output ratio in 1953, which is 2.4097, and (ii) the R&D investment rate
in 1953, which is 1.0 percent.
6 Numerical Results
6.1 Benchmark Economy
Major Economic Variables Table 3 summarizes the main properties of the long-run equilibrium in
our benchmark model. Apart from the ve targeted statistics, our model is also able to match quite closely
two other statistics that are not targeted. The rst one is the average value of the consumption-output
ratio in the United States over the period 1953-2009. The second one is the average value of the ratio
of total tax receipts to U.S. GDP.50 The last result shows that the size of government in our model is
similar to its real-world counterpart. Table 4 shows the predicted values of four great ratiosover the
period 1953-2009. Overall, our benchmark model is able to generate reasonable values for these ratios.
The model, however, cannot capture the secular movements of the capital-output ratio and the downward
trend of labor income share.
Patterns of R&D Investment Rate Figure 9 shows the time series of R&D investment rate generated
by our benchmark model along with the actual data. In the year 1953, total R&D spending accounted
for about one percent of GDP in the United States. This increased sharply during the subsequent years,
peaked at 2.20 percent in 1963, and declined during the second half of the 1960s. Our model is able to
49For the period 1983-2009, the average annual growth rate of real GDP per-worker is 1.60 percent, the share of labor
income in U.S. GDP is 0.5050, the average capital-output ratio is 2.4235, and the average (before-tax) rate of return from
physical capital is again 8 percent. All these values are quite close to their counterparts for the period 1953-2009. Thus, our
fth target is not inconsistent with the rst four targets.
50Total tax receipts is dened as the sum of revenues collected from (i) personal income taxes, (ii) taxes on production and
imports, (iii) taxes on corporate incomes, and (iv) contributions for government social insurance. These data are obtained
from the National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.1.
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mimic this hump-shaped pattern, though the peak magnitude of the model-generated series is lower than
that in the data. In our benchmark model, R&D investment rate increases from 0.93 percent to 1.97
percent over the period 1953-1963. Thus, the model is able to explain about 86 percent of the observed
increase in R&D investment rate during this period. Our benchmark model is also able to replicate the
U-shaped pattern over the period 1969-1985.
The sharp uctuations in the model-generated series during 1981-1990 are mainly driven by the changes
in the combined subsidy rate for private R&D. For instance, the sharp increase in 1981 and 1990 are driven
by the increase in R&D tax credit in these two years. Similarly, the abrupt fall in 1987 is due to the
reduction in corporate income tax which lowers the combined subsidy rate. The e¤ects of these policies
will be further explored in Section 6.2.
Growth Accounting Between 1953 and 2009, real per-worker GDP in the United States has increased
by a factor of 2.384, which is equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 1.56 percent. In our benchmark
model, real per-worker output has increased by a factor of 2.473 during the transition period. This implies
an average annual growth rate of 1.63 percent. Using the standard growth accounting technique, we can
decompose this growth rate into (i) TFP growth and (ii) the growth of physical capital per worker.
Formally, let yt  Yt=Nt and kt  Kt=Nt denote per-worker output and per-worker capital at time t:
Using the equations in Section 4.2, we can express the growth of yt as
yt+1
yt
=
"
At+1
At

	t+1
	t
1 #
| {z }
TFP Growth


kt+1
kt

| {z }
Capital Deepening
:
The rst component in the above expression mainly captures the contribution of TFP growth, and the
second component captures the contribution of capital deepening.51 The value of  is 0.4615 under
the baseline parameterization. Using equation (39), we can further decompose TFP growth into two
components: (i) growth due to fundamental knowledge accumulation, and (ii) growth due to quality
improvement. The results of this exercise are summarized in the rst column of Table 5. Between
1953 and 2009, the average annual growth rate of TFP in the benchmark model is 0.94 percent. This
accounts for about 58 percent of the average annual growth rate of per-worker output in the model. The
remaining 42 percent is due to capital deepening. These results are consistent with the empirical ndings
51Changes in At are entirely driven by the changes in the employment share of high-skilled workers (t) : For the period
1953-2009, the value of At has only reduced by 1.2 percent, while the value of 	t has increased by 270 percent. Thus, the
growth of the rst component is essentially driven by the growth of 	t:
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in Aghion and Howitt (2007, Table 1). In our benchmark model, 56 percent of TFP growth is due to the
accumulation of fundamental knowledge. The remaining 44 percent is due to quality improvement.
6.2 Counterfactual Experiments
In the benchmark model, we have taken into account changes in several exogenous factors, such as
(i) corporate income tax, (ii) R&D tax credit, (iii) the share of government basic research spending
in total R&D expenditures, and (iv) the growth rates of high-skilled and low-skilled employment. In
this subsection, we examine the signicance of each of these factors in explaining R&D investment and
economic growth over the period 1953-2009. This is achieved by considering a series of counterfactual
experiments. In the rst experiment, the corporate income tax rate is xed at its 1953 value, so that
p;t = 0:52; for all t  0: All other parameters are the same as in the benchmark economy. In the second
experiment, the R&D subsidy rate is xed at its 1953 value, so that d;t = 0:0007; for all t  0: The
time paths of the combined subsidy rate in these two experiments are shown in Figure 10. In the third
experiment, the share of government basic research spending in total R&D expenditures is xed at its
1953 value, so that $t = 0:0725; for all t  0: In the fourth experiment, we assume that high-skilled
and low-skilled employment have been growing at the same rate since 1953. As a result, the employment
share of high-skilled workers has remained constant since 1953, i.e., t = 0:0079; for all t  0: We
have also performed three other experiments in which the tax rates on consumption, labor income and
capital income are xed at their 1953 values. In terms of R&D investment and economic growth, these
counterfactual scenarios produce essentially the same results as the benchmark model.52 Hence, we do
not report these results here.
Figure 11 shows the R&D investment rates generated by the economy in Experiment 1, along with
the benchmark results and the actual data. Fixing the corporate income tax rate at 52 percent has two
opposing e¤ects on R&D investment. On one hand, higher tax rates lower the (after-tax) prots that
can be extracted from an improved product, and thereby lower the rms incentive to innovate. Holding
other factors constant, this will lower the R&D investment rate in every period. On the other hand, the
combined subsidy rates after 1986 are now substantially higher than those in the benchmark model (see
Figure 10). This induces a strong increase in R&D investment from 1986 onward which more than o¤sets
52 In the time-series data that we inputted into the model, the capital income tax rates have not changed much over time.
Thus, xing this tax rate at its 1953 value has very little impact on our benchmark results. However, this does not mean
that capital income tax is unimportant in our model. As we will see in Section 6.4, large changes in the long-run value of
this tax rate will have signicant impact on the long-run interest rate; which will in turn a¤ect private R&D investment and
consumer welfare.
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the reduction brought by the rst e¤ect. Thus, for the period 1986-2009, the R&D investment rates in
Experiment 1 are actually higher than in the benchmark model. Note that without the tax cut in 1987,
the model no longer predicts an abrupt fall in R&D investment rate in this year.
Figure 12 shows the R&D investment rates generated by the economy in Experiment 2. For the
period prior 1981, the combined subsidy rates in this experiment are the same as in the benchmark
model. Thus, the two sets of results coincide before 1981. For the period 1981-2009, the combined
subsidy rates in Experiment 2 are lower than in the benchmark model. As a result, the R&D investment
rates in Experiment 2 are also lower than in the benchmark model over this time period. Note that
without the increase in R&D tax credit in 1981 and 1990, the model no longer predicts a sharp increase
in R&D investment rate in these two years.
While changes in corporate income tax and R&D subsidy have direct impact on the rmsincentive
to innovate and hence their demand for high-skilled workers, these policy changes have no e¤ect on the
supply of these workers. In the current framework, the equilibrium quantity of labor input in private R&D
is determined by (1 $t)NH;t in every period t: The allocation of this input across rms is determined
by the function M;t () as specied in Proposition 2. Neither (1 $t)NH;t nor M;t () is a¤ected by the
corporate income tax rate and the R&D subsidy rate. Consequently, these policy instruments have no
e¤ect on the equilibrium dynamics of Xt and Qt, and no e¤ect on economic growth in both the short run
and the long run. These ndings are summarized in the second and third columns of Table 5. This also
means that the results in Figures 11 and 12 are merely reecting the e¤ects of these policy instruments
on the wage rate of high-skilled workers.
In the third experiment, the share of government basic research spending in total R&D expenditures
($t) is xed at its 1953 value. As shown in Figure 8, this share has increased substantially since 1960.
Thus, for most part of the transition period, the economy in Experiment 3 has a much smaller scale of basic
research than in the benchmark economy. As a result of this, the average growth rate of Xt in Experiment
3 is about 44 percent lower than in the benchmark model (see the fourth column of Table 5). This in turn
reduces the growth rates of TFP and per-worker output by 25.5 percent and 14.7 percent, respectively.
Figure 13 summarizes the changes in the level of private R&D spending during the transition period. To
better understand these changes, we have performed two additional steps: First, we have separated the
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changes in private R&D spending into quantity changes and price changes according to
Private R&D Spending = (1 $t)NH;t| {z }
Quantity
 wH;t|{z}
Price
:
Second, we have expressed all the values in Figure 13 as ratios to the benchmark results.53
Since the values of NH;t in this experiment are the same as in the benchmark model, the quantity
changes depicted in Figure 13 are entirely due to changes in (1 $t) : A reduction in $t means that a
larger fraction of high-skilled workers are now allocated to quality improvement research. Thus, holding
other things constant, these quantity changes will lead to higher levels of private R&D spending and
lower growth rates of fundamental knowledge. The e¤ects on wH;t are threefold: First, a reduction in $t
increases the supply of high-skilled workers in the private sector, which pushes down the equilibrium wage
rate. Second, since fundamental knowledge is conducive to the e¢ ciency of private R&D, a reduction in the
growth rate of Xt will lower the net gain from an improved product, and thereby lower the rmsdemand
for high-skilled workers. Finally, a reduction in $t will also a¤ect private R&D through the equilibrium
interest rate. This happens because fundamental knowledge is also conducive to rm productivity. Thus,
a slowdown in the accumulation of fundamental knowledge will have a negative impact on the marginal
product of physical capital. For this reason, the equilibrium interest rates in Experiment 3 are much
lower than in the benchmark model (see Figure 14). From an innovating rms perspective, this means
the prot stream generated by an improved product is now discounted at lower rates. This leads to a
higher net gain from quality improvement research, and thereby encourages the demand for researchers.
The third e¤ect is the reason why the values of wH;t in Experiment 3 are higher than in the benchmark
model during the early stage of the transition period. Eventually, the rst two e¤ects dominate and
depress the value of wH;t:
In the fourth experiment, we assume that high-skilled and low-skilled employment have been growing
at the same rate since 1953. As suggested by Figure 6, this means the economy in Experiment 4 has a much
smaller number of researchers than in the benchmark economy. As shown in the fth column of Table
5, the reduction in high-skilled labor has a detrimental impact on research activities and technological
progress. Specically, the average growth rates of Xt and Qt in Experiment 4 are 52.7 percent and 54.4
53 In Experiments 1 and 2, changes in p;t and d;t have no e¤ect on the equilibrium time path of aggregate output. In
other words, these changes do not a¤ect the denominator of R&D investment rate. Hence, it makes little di¤erence whether
we report the R&D investment rates or the levels of R&D spending in Figures 11 and 12. The changes that we considered
in Experiments 3 and 4, however, will change both R&D spending and aggregate output. The e¤ects on aggregate output
are already summarized in Table 5, so we choose to focus on the level of R&D spending in Figures 13 and 15.
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percent lower than in the benchmark model. These together reduce the growth rates of TFP and per-
worker output by 45.7 percent and 33.1 percent, respectively. Figure 15 shows that reducing the number
of researchers will have a strong positive impact on their wage rate. This is mainly due to a combination
of reduced supply and lower values of interest rate (see Figure 14). These price changes partly o¤set the
reduction in private R&D spending brought by the quantity changes.
6.3 Long-run Equilibrium
In this subsection, we focus on the long-run balanced-growth equilibrium of our model and perform two
sets of comparative statics exercises. The rst exercise is intended to quantify the long-run e¤ects of
government basic research spending. This is achieved by computing a series of balanced-growth equilibria
under di¤erent values of $ ranging from zero to 0.20. In each of these equilibria, the parameters f; ; g
are recalibrated so that three of the targeted statistics (the share of labor income in total output, real
interest rate and capital-output ratio) are the same as in the benchmark model. All other parameters
are xed at their benchmark values. In the second exercise, we examine how changes in f; %;  g would
a¤ect the benchmark results. To achieve this, we compute a series of long-run equilibria, each involves
changing the value of one of these parameters. The values of f; ; g are again recalibrated in each case.
All other parameters (including $) are xed at their benchmark values.
The results of the rst exercise are shown in Figures 16a and 16b. The main message of our ndings is
clear: By expanding the scale of publicly nanced basic research, the government can e¤ectively promote
total R&D investment and long-term economic growth. For instance, increasing $ from its benchmark
value (13.86 percent) to 20 percent will raise the R&D investment rate from 2.08 percent to 2.52 percent
and the long-run growth rate from 1.56 percent to 2.31 percent. On the other hand, if we completely
eliminate government-nanced basic research (by setting $ = 0), then the long-run growth rate will
drop to 0.53 percent. This result suggests that about two-thirds of the long-term economic growth in our
benchmark model is originated from basic research. Figure 16b shows that private R&D investment also
increases as $ increases. This result, however, depends crucially on our treatment of the long-run interest
rate. If the long-run interest rate is allowed to vary, then expanding the scale of government-nanced
basic research will lower private R&D investment. This happens because an increase in $ will drive up
the long-run interest rate. For reasons explained earlier, such an increase will lower the equilibrium wage
rate for high-skilled workers and thereby lower private R&D spending.
The results of the second exercise are reported in Table 6. First, changing the value of  (which is
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the elasticity of TFP with respect to fundamental knowledge) has no e¤ect on the growth rates of Xt
and Qt: This happens because this parameter does not appear in equations (26) and (41) which capture
the basic and non-basic research processes. Increasing this parameter value, however, will enhance the
benets of fundamental knowledge on rm productivity. Thus, holding other things constant, a higher
value of  will increase TFP growth and long-term economic growth. Second, increasing the value of %
will enhance the benets of fundamental knowledge on basic and non-basic research. This has the e¤ect
of encouraging private R&D investment and stimulating the growth of Xt and Qt: Overall, the results in
Table 6 suggest that our benchmark model is not very sensitive to changes in  and %:
Finally, we consider the e¤ects of changing the value of  : This parameter has two roles in our
model. First, it determines the elasticity of substitution between any two types of intermediate inputs
in the production of nal goods. Second, it determines the extent of markup over the cost of producing
intermediate goods. In the baseline parameterization,  is set equal to 0:9091 which implies a ten percent
markup rate: In the comparative statics exercise, we consider two alternative values:  = 0:9524 which
implies a markup rate of ve percent, and  = 0:8696 which implies a markup rate of fteen percent.
Reducing the value of  has two main e¤ects. First, by increasing the markup rate and the monopoly
prots from an improved product, such a reduction will encourage private R&D investment. Second,
reducing the value of  will increase the complementarity between di¤erent types of intermediate inputs.
Holding other factors constant, this will induce a redistribution of high-skilled labor from high-quality
rms to low-quality ones.54 Such a redistribution will promote the growth rate of Qt; which will in turn
lead to a faster growth rate of TFP and per-worker output. Because of these two e¤ects, our benchmark
model is rather sensitive to changes in  :
6.4 Welfare Analysis
We now turn to the e¤ects of government basic research spending on consumer welfare. Suppose the
model economy is initially in the benchmark long-run balanced-growth equilibrium with $0 = 0:1386
and 0 = 0:0156 (the status quo). Suppose now the government wants to achieve a long-term growth
target 1 > 0 by permanently increasing the scale of basic research from $0 to $1: After the new policy
is announced and implemented, the economy gradually converges to a new long-run balanced-growth
54As shown in Proposition 2, the allocation of high-skilled labor across rms is determined by M;t (q) =
(1 $t)NH;t (q=Qt)
 
1  : Note that the value of  = (1   ) decreases as  decreases. For the values of  that we have
considered,  = (1   ) > 1: Thus, decreasing the value of  will raise the value of M;t (q) for q < Qt and reduce the value
of M;t (q) for q > Qt: In other words, high-skilled workers are redistributed from high-quality rms to low-quality ones.
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equilibrium with $1 and 1: The task at hand is to quantify the welfare e¤ects induced by this policy
change. This is achieved by constructing a consumption-equivalent measure of welfare changes along
the line of Lucas (1987). Formally, let fcs;tg1t=0 be the equilibrium consumption sequence for a type-s
consumer in the status quo, and let fecs;t ($1)g1t=0 be the equilibrium consumption sequence under the
new policy. Time 0 in here refers to the period when the new policy is announced and implemented. Our
welfare measure zs ($1) is dened according to
1X
t=0
tNs;tU [zs ($

1) cs;t] =
1X
t=0
tNs;tU [ecs;t ($1)] : (48)
The intuition behind this measure is as follows. Suppose the type-s household is better o¤ under the new
policy, so that
1X
t=0
tNs;tU (cs;t) <
1X
t=0
tNs;tU [ecs;t ($1)] :
In this case, the value of zs ($1) is greater than one. Equation (48) states that the welfare gain brought
by the new policy is equivalent to increasing the status-quo consumption by a factor of zs ($1) > 1 in
every period. Conversely, zs ($1) is less than one if the type-s household is worse o¤ under the new
policy. In this case, each type-s consumer is willing to give up a fraction [1  zs ($1)] of his status-quo
consumption in every period so as to revert the policy change.
Following our discussion in the previous sections, we know that changes in the value of $ will induce
signicant changes in the equilibrium interest rate, which will in turn a¤ect the equilibrium wage rate for
high-skilled workers. To highlight the welfare e¤ects of these changes, we compute our welfare measures
under two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, all parameters except $ are xed at their benchmark
values. In particular, the employment growth rates and all other exogenous policy variables are assumed
to be constant over time and take the same values as in the benchmark model. In the second scenario, the
increase in $ is accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in the capital income tax rate a at time t = 0:
The new value of a is chosen so that the real interest rate in the new long-run equilibrium is the same as
in the benchmark model (i.e., 8 percent). All other parameters are xed at their benchmark values. The
results of these exercises are reported in Table 7. The rst two columns of this table show the long-term
growth target and the required value of $1: The third, fourth and fth columns show some properties
of the new long-run equilibrium. The last two columns show the consumption-equivalent measures of
welfare changes. Panel A reports the results obtained when a is xed at its benchmark value. Panel
B reports the results obtained when a is adjusted so that the long-run interest rate is maintained at
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8 percent. In both scenarios, increasing the value of $ creates signicant welfare gains for both types
of consumers. However, the magnitude of these gains (especially for the high-skilled workers) depend
crucially on our treatment of the long-run interest rate. In the rst scenario, an increase in $ will drive
up the equilibrium real interest rate which a¤ect negatively the wage rate for high-skilled workers. As a
result of this, the ratio between wH;t and wL;t declines initially along the transition path. This explains
why the welfare gains for high-skilled consumers are slightly less than those for the low-skilled consumers
in Panel A. In the second scenario, the negative price changes due to the increase in interest rate are
mitigated. As a result, the ratio between wH;t and wL;t is monotonically increasing along the transition
path, and the values of zH ($1) are much higher than those of zL ($1) in Panel B.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed an endogenous growth model which takes into account both public
and private R&D investment, and the di¤erences between basic and non-basic research. In particular,
the present study represents one of the few attempts to explore the signicance of basic research in a
dynamic general equilibrium model. Our results suggest that the accumulation of fundamental knowledge
is an important contributing factor to U.S. economic growth. In terms of policy implications, this means
government spending on basic research is a powerful policy instrument to promote economic growth.
Two other important ndings also emerged from the analysis. First, subsidizing private R&D investment
(either through tax exemption or tax credit) has no e¤ect on economic growth in both the short run and
the long run. Second, the rapid increase in the number of scientists and engineers in the past several
decades has a major contribution to U.S. economic growth. Taken together, these two results suggest
that it is more important to stimulate the supply of researchers than to stimulate the demand for them.
Since the supply of researchers is often a¤ected by other government policies (such as immigration policies
and education policies), our results suggest that these policies may also be important in explaining R&D
investment and economic growth. One direction of future research is to examine these issues using the
model developed in this study.
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Table 1 Distribution of S&E Articles Published by U.S. Institutions (%)
1995 2000 2005
Government 8.9 (9.1) 8.1 (8.8) 7.5 (8.0)
Industry 8.1 (18.8) 7.3 (16.5) 6.4 (14.5)
Academia 71.6 (51.2) 72.8 (53.6) 74.6 (57.0)
FFRDCs 2.8 (11.2) 2.7 (11.7) 2.8 (8.6)
Non-Prot 8.0 (9.8) 8.5 (9.4) 8.2 (11.9)
Note: S&Estands for science and engineering. FFRDCsstands for federally
funded research and development centers. Figures in parentheses are the shares of
basic research performed by the sectors.
Source: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2012.
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Table 2 Baseline Parameterization
n Long-run population growth rate 0.0150
 Long-run population share of high-skilled workers 0.0297
 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution 2.0000
 Subjective discount factor 0.9738y
 Share of intermediate input expenses in nal output 0.7348
 Inverse of markup over marginal cost 0.9091
 Elasticity of TFP with respect to public R&D capital 0.1000
 Input share in intermediate good production 0.6281y
# Degree of diminishing returns to private R&D input 0.5000
% Parameter in basic and non-basic research 0.1300
' Parameter in basic research 0.2020y
 Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.0929y
 Size of quality improvement 1.0236y
w Long-run tax rate on labor income 0.3530
a Long-run tax rate on interest income 0.2602
c Long-run tax rate on private consumption 0.0429
p Long-run tax rate on corporate income 0.3500
d Long-run subsidy rate on private R&D spending 0.1222
$ Long-run share of basic research spending in total R&D 0.1386
Note: Parameters marked with an yare determined by the calibration procedure des-
cribed in Section 5.2. All other parameter values are chosen based on empirical evidence.
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Table 3 Long-run Equilibrium in the Benchmark Economy
Data Model
Annual growth rate (%) 1.56* 1.56
Before-tax interest rate (%) 8.00* 8.00
Ratios to GDP
Physical capital 2.4272* 2.4272
Labor income 0.5342* 0.5344
Total R&D spending 0.0206* 0.0208
Private consumption 0.6505 0.6997
Total tax revenues 0.2629 0.3007
Notes: Data marked with an asterisk are the target statistics.
Table 4 Benchmark Economy during the Transition Period
1953-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-09 1953-2009
Ratios to GDP
Physical capital
Model 2.49 2.52 2.42 2.33 2.25 2.19 2.36
Data 2.44 2.23 2.56 2.56 2.30 2.49 2.43
Labor income
Model 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53
Data 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.53
Consumption
Model 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.71
Data 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.65
Tax receipts
Model 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.30
Data 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.26
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Table 5 Counterfactual Experiments
Counterfactual Experiments
Benchmark (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average growth rates (%)
Per-worker output 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.35 1.09
Per-worker capital 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.39 1.25
TFP 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.70 0.51
Public R&D capital 3.13 3.13 3.13 1.75 1.65
Aggregate quality 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.31
Contributions to output growth (%)
Per-worker capital 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.58
TFP 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.70 0.51
Contributions to TFP growth (%)
Public R&D capital 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.30 0.28
Aggregate quality 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.23
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Table 6 Sensitivity of Long-Run Equilibrium to Selected Parameters
Long-term Growth Rate (%) % of R&D Spending in Total Output
y TFP X Q Public Private Total
Benchmark 1.56 0.84 2.88 0.47 0.29 1.79 2.08
 = 0:0500 1.10 0.59 2.88 0.47 0.28 1.71 1.99
 = 0:1500 2.03 1.09 2.88 0.47 0.30 1.88 2.18
% = 0:0400 1.38 0.74 2.54 0.41 0.27 1.66 1.93
% = 0:2800 2.02 1.07 3.70 0.60 0.33 2.07 2.40
 = 0:9524 0.66 0.35 1.15 0.21 0.13 0.82 0.95
 = 0:8696 2.70 1.43 5.02 0.78 0.48 3.01 3.49
Note: The variable y stands for per-worker output. The benchmark values are  = 0:1; % = 0:13
and  = 0:9091:
Table 7 Welfare Analysis
Panel (A) Long-run interest rate is allowed to vary.
Share of Total Output
 $ r Private R&D Total R&D zL ($1) zH ($1)
0.0156 0.1386 0.0800 0.0179 0.0208 1.0000 1.0000
0.0160 0.1430 0.0813 0.0178 0.0208 1.0097 0.0094
0.0170 0.1520 0.0839 0.0176 0.0208 1.0296 1.0286
0.0180 0.1610 0.0867 0.0175 0.0208 1.0496 1.0480
Panel (B) Long-run interest rate is xed at benchmark value.
Share of Total Output
 $ a Private R&D Total R&D zL ($1) zH ($1)
0.0156 0.1386 0.2602 0.0179 0.0208 1.0000 1.0000
0.0160 0.1430 0.2490 0.0180 0.0210 1.0109 1.0166
0.0170 0.1520 0.2240 0.0183 0.0216 1.0335 1.0522
0.0180 0.1610 0.1980 0.0186 0.0222 1.0560 1.0890
Note: Figures in bold are results from the benchmark model (the status quo).
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Figure 1: Share of Total R&D Spending in U.S. GDP, 1953-2009.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Total R&D Spending by Type of Research, 1953-2009.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Basic Research Expenditures by Source of Funds,
1953-2009.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Applied Research and Development Spending by Source
of Funds, 1953-2009.
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(1953 = 1.0).
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Figure 7: Tax Incentives for Private R&D in the United States.
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Figure 8: Share of Government Basic Research Spending in Our Measure of Total
R&D Expenditures.
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Figure 9: R&D Investment Rates in Benchmark Economy.
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Figure 10: Combined Subsidy Rates for Private R&D in Experiments 1 and 2.
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Figure 11: R&D Investment Rates in Experiment 1.
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Figure 12: R&D Investment Rates in Experiment 2.
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Figure 14: Real Interest Rates in Experiments 3 and 4.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Derivations
Final-Good Producers Problem
Equation (7) can be derived as follows. First, note that even though the nal-good producer can choose
to have Mt (j; !) = 0 for some (j; !) ; it must use at least one quality grade of each type of intermediate
input so that fMt (!) > 0 for all ! 2 [0; 1] : Let ept (!) be the lowest quality-adjusted price of intermediate
good ! 2 [0; 1] : Equation (6) can be restated as
ept (!) = t Mt
LY;t
 1
M1  t
hfMt (!)i  1 =  Yt
M t
!hfMt (!)i  1 : (49)
Let Et be the total expenditure on intermediate inputs at time t: Then, we have
Et 
Z 1
0
24Jt(!)X
j=1
pt (j; !)Mt (j; !)
35 d!
=
Z 1
0
ept (!)
24Jt(!)X
j=1
jMt (j; !)
35 d! = Z 1
0
ept (!)fMt (!) d!: (50)
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function in (1), the parameter  indicates the share of Et in total
output, i.e., Et = Yt:55 Substituting this into (49) and rearranging terms gives
fMt (!) =  Et
M t
! 1
1  
[ept (!)]  11  :
Substituting this into (50) gives
Et =
 
Et
M t
! 1
1  Z 1
0
[ept (!)]   1  d! =  Et
M t
! 1
1  
(Pt) 
 
1  :
Combining these two equations gives
fMt (!) = [ept (!)]  11  (Pt)  1  Et: (51)
If the nal-good producer chooses to employ only intermediate good (j; !) ; then we have fMt (!) =
jMt (j; !) and ept (!) = pt (j; !) =j : Equation (7) can be obtained by substituting these into (51).
55One can also derive this directly by rst multiplying both sides of (49) by fMt (!) ; and then integrating across all types
of intermediate inputs.
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Production in Intermediate-Goods Sector
The minimum cost required to produce M  0 units of intermediate good (j; !) can be obtained by
solving the problem below:
Ct
 
M
  min
LM;t;Kt
fwL;tLM;t +RtKtg ;
subject to tK

t L
1 
M;t M: The solution of this problem involves a pair of factor demand functions:
LM;t =
M
t

wL;t
1  
 Rt


and Kt =
M
t

wL;t
1  
1 Rt

 1
; (52)
and a linear cost function. The derivations of the cost function and the optimal monopoly price are
standard and thus omitted.
Equilibrium Analysis
Income Accounting
First, consider the nal-good sector. Given the Cobb-Douglas production function in (1), it is immediate
to see that
wL;tLY;t = (1  )Yt; and Et = Yt: (53)
Next, consider the intermediate-goods sector. Let Qt (!) be the state-of-the-art quality for intermediate
good ! 2 [0; 1] : Then the quality-adjusted price of this product is
ept (!) = pt
Qt (!)
=
t
 
[Qt (!)]
 1 :
Substituting this into (8) gives
Pt =

t
 

(Qt) 1 ;
where
Qt 
Z 1
0
[Qt (!)]
 
1  d!
 1  
 
=
24X
q2Q
ft (q) q
 
1  
35
1  
 
:
Substituting the expression for Pt into (14) and (15) gives
Mt (q) =

t
 
 1 q
Qt
  
1  
Et; and t (q) = (1   )

q
Qt
  
1  
Et: (54)
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Substituting Mt (q) into (52) gives the factor demand functions for rms with state-of-the-art quality q;
LM;t (q) =
 (1  )Et
wL;t

q
Qt
  
1  
; and Kt (q) =
 Et
Rt

q
Qt
  
1  
:
Aggregating these factor demand functions across the quality distribution gives
wL;t
X
q2Q
ft (q)LM;t (q) =  (1  )Et =  (1  )Yt; (55)
Rt
X
q2Q
ft (q)Kt (q) =  Et =  Yt: (56)
Similarly, aggregating the prot function in (54) across all intermediate-good producers gives
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) = (1   )Et = (1   )Yt:
To summarize, nal goods produced in each period are distributed according to
Yt = wL;tLY;t + wL;tLM;t +RtKt +
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) ;
where LM;t 
P
q2Q ft (q)LM;t (q) is the total number of low-skilled workers employed in the intermediate-
goods sector. Equations (53) and (55) imply
LY;t
LM;t
=
1  
 (1  ):
Thus, we can write LY;t = sYNL;t and LM;t = (1  sY )NL;t; where
sY  1  
1  +  (1  ) 2 (0; 1) :
Recall the denition of distributed dividends in (16). Aggregating this across the quality distribution
gives X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) = (1  p;t)
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q)  (1  p;t   d;t)wH;t (1 $t)NH;t
)
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) = p;t
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) +
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) + (1  p;t   d;t)wH;t (1 $t)NH;t:
The last equation shows that monopoly prots in each period are divided among three uses: (i) corporate
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income tax, (ii) dividend income to equity holders, and (iii) subsidized wages to private-sector researchers,
which is equivalent to private R&D spending paid by the monopolists.
Final Output
We now provide a formal derivation of (37). Substituting the expression for Mt (q) into (3) gives
Mt =
8<:X
q2Q
ft (q) [qMt (q)]
 
9=;
1
 
=
 EtQt
t
=
 YtQt
t
:
Recall the denition of t in (12). Substituting (55) and (56) into this gives
t  1
t

 Yt
Kt
 Yt
LM;t
1 
=
 Yt
tK

tL
1 
M;t
:
Combining these two equations givesMt = QttK

tL
1 
M;t : Substituting this expression into the production
function in (1) gives
Yt = 
1+
t Q

t K

t L
(1 )
M;t L
1 
Y;t :
Since LY;t = sYNL;t and LM;t = (1  sY )NL;t, we can rewrite this as
Yt = s
1 
Y (1  sY )(1 )| {z }eA
1+t Q

t K

t N
1 
L;t ;
where  2 (0; 1) : This is the aggregate production function in (37).
Dynamics of Aggregate Quality Index
We now provide a formal derivation of (41). Recall the rst-order condition for M;t; i.e.,
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;t = #

t (q)

M;t (q)
M;t
# 1 Vt+1 (q)  Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

: (57)
Multiplying both sides by M;t (q) gives
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;tM;t (q) = #bt (q) Vt+1 (q)  Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

:
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Suppose the conditions in Proposition 3 are satised. Then we have Vt (q) =  tq
 
1  for all q: After
substituting this into the above expression and aggregating across the quality distribution, we can get
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;tM;t = #
264 t+1


 
1    1

1 + rt+1
375
24X
q2Q
ft (q) bt (q) q  1  
35 : (58)
Similarly, substituting the expressions of  (q; qt) ; Vt (q) and M;t (q) into (57) gives
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;t = #
 (qt)
X%t Q
(1 #) 
1  
t
264 t+1


 
1    1

1 + rt+1
375 (59)
Combining (58) and (59) gives
X
q2Q
ft (q) bt (q) q  1  = 1
 (qt)
(1 $t)NH;tX%t Q
(1 #) 
1  
t : (60)
Next, using (19)-(21), we can get
X
q2Q
ft+1 (q) q
 
1  = ft+1 (1) + ft+1 ()
 
1  + ft+1
 
2
  
2
  
1  + ::::
=
h
1  bt (1)i ft (1) + nbt (1) ft (1) + h1  bt ()i ft ()o  1  + :::
=
h
1 +


 
1    1
 bt (1)i ft (1) + h1 +   1    1 bt ()i  1  ft () + :::
=
X
q2Q
h
1 +


 
1    1
 bt (q)i q  1  ft (q) :
Hence, we have
X
q2Q
ft+1 (q) q
 
1  =
X
q2Q
ft (q) q
 
1  +


 
1    1
X
q2Q
ft (q) bt (q) q  1  
) (Qt+1)
 
1  = (Qt)
 
1  +
1
 (qt)
(1 $t)


 
1    1

NH;tX
%
t Q
(1 #) 
1  
t :
Equation (41) follows immediately from this equation.
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Dynamical System in Transformed Variables
Equations (42) and (43) are derived as follows. Dene bct  Ct= (	tNt) and bkt  Kt= (	tNt) : Dividing
both sides of the economy-wide resources constraint by 	tNt gives
bct + 	t+1Nt+1
	tNt
bkt+1   (1  )bkt = Atbkt :
Equation (42) follows immediately from this expression. As shown in the main text, aggregate consump-
tion at time t can be expressed as
Ct = [1 + (
   1) t]NtcL;t ) bct = 1
	t
[1 + (   1) t] cL;t:
The growth of bct is then determined by
bct+1bct =

	t+1
	t
 1 1 + (   1) t+1
1 + (   1) t

cL;t+1
cL;t
:
Equation (43) can be obtained by combining this and the Euler equation in (29).
Consumption Ratio between High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Households
The consumption ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled households is constant over time and is denoted
by : The mathematical derivation of  is tedious and does not add much to our understanding of the
model. Hence, we only describe the key steps here.56 First, using the exogenous sequence of tax rates
and the equilibrium time paths of prices and transfers, we can construct the consolidated (or lifetime)
budget constraint for the two households. In the consolidated budget constraint, the total discounted
value of lifetime consumption is equated to the total discounted value of lifetime income plus the quantity
of initial assets (As;0) : Second, by repeated substitutions using the Euler equation in (29), we can get
cs;t+1 =

 eRt+1 1  1 +  c;t
1 +  c;t+1
 1

cs;t =
24t+1Y
j=1

 eRj 1
35 1 +  c;0
1 +  c;t+1
 1

cs;0;
for s 2 fH;Lg ; where eRt  1+(1  a;t) rt: Third, after substituting the above expression into the consoli-
dated budget constraint, we can derive an expression for cs;0 in terms of fa;t;  c;t; a;t; ws;t; rt;s;t; Ns;tg1t=0
and As;0: Finally, we need to determine the value of
P
s2fH;LgAs;0 and how it is allocated between the
56A complete derivation of  is available from the author upon request.
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two types of households. After solving for the equilibrium time paths of all major aggregate variables,
we can derive the value of
P
s2fH;LgAs;0 (by backward induction from the unique long-run equilibrium)
using the zero-prot condition for the nancial intermediaries, i.e.,
Kt+1 + (1 + rt)
X
s2fH;Lg
As;t = (1 + rt)Kt +
X
q2Q
ft (q)t (q) +
X
s2fH;Lg
As;t+1:
Once the value of
P
s2fH;LgAs;0 is known, we then divide it between the two households according to
AH;0
AL;0
=
NH;0
NL;0
=
0
1  0 :
This is equivalent to assuming that all the initial assets are distributed evenly among all the individuals,
regardless of their skill level.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix zt > 0 and $t 2 (0; 1) : A set of basic research projects Dt  [0; zt] is called feasible if it satises
the policy constraint at time t; i.e.,
R
Dt dz = $tzt: The proof of this proposition is built upon a simple
observation: Consider an arbitrary interval D0 =

d; d

, with 0  d < d < zt that is feasible under $t:
For any " 2  0; zt   d ; construct another interval D" = d+ "; d+ " which is also feasible under $t:
Then we will have
R
D"
e (z) dz > RD0 e (z) dz: This intermediate result has the following implication: For
any given values of fzt; $t; Xt; NH;t;Qtg and for any feasible interval D0 with upper boundary d < zt;
we can always increase the growth rate of public R&D capital by shifting the interval D0 to the right.
We will refer to D" as a rightward shift of D0: The proof of this claim is straightforward. Since e () is a
strictly increasing function, the expected value of e () over the range D" must be greater than that over
the range D0: Formally, this means
1
d  d
Z
D"
e (z) dz > 1
d  d
Z
D0
e (z) dz ) Z
D"
e (z) dz > Z
D0
e (z) dz:
We now apply this result to show that the interval Dt = [dt; zt] ; with dt  (1 $t) zt, dominates all
other feasible set. Given a continuous distribution function of z; any feasible set of research projects can
be expressed as the union of a nite collection of disjoint intervals. Let fD1;t; :::;DI;tg be an arbitrary
nite collection of disjoint intervals so that its union is a feasible set. If I = 1; then by the above
argument, we can always increase the growth rate of public R&D capital by shifting the interval to the
right until the upper boundary is zt: Suppose I > 1: Let Di;t =

di;t; di;t

; with di;t < di;t  zt for all i:
The intervals are arranged so that d1;t < ::: < dI;t: Since these are disjoint intervals, we have di;t < di+1;t,
for i = 1; 2; :::; I   1: The growth rate of public R&D capital between period t and t+ 1 is given by
"
1
zt
IX
i=1
Z
Di;t
e (z) dz#NH;tX%t [= (Qt)] 1 :
Fix the values of fzt; $t; Xt; NH;t;Qtg : Now consider another collection of intervals
n
D01;t; :::;D0I;t
o
, with
D0i;t = Di;t for i 2 f1; 2; :::; I   2; Ig ; and D0I 1;t =
h
d0I 1;t; d
0
I 1;t
i
so that
d
0
I 1;t = dI;t; and d
0
I 1;t   d0I 1;t = dI 1;t   dI 1;t:
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In words, these mean DI 1;t and D0I 1;t have the same mass under the uniform distribution so that the
union of
n
D01;t; :::;D0I;t
o
is also a feasible set. In addition, D0I 1;t is a rightward shift of DI 1;t which meansR
D0I 1;t
e (z) dz > RDI 1;t e (z) dz: Hence, the growth rate of public R&D capital under nD01;t; :::;D0I;to is
higher than that under fD1;t; :::;DI;tg : Note that D0I 1;t and D0I;t now form a single interval

d0I 1;t; dI;t

;
thus there are only (I   1) disjoint intervals in
n
D01;t; :::;D0I;t
o
: In other words, we can increase the growth
rate of public R&D capital by collapsing the disjoint intervals. By repeating the same argument, we can
show that one single interval with endpoints
 
dI;t  $tzt

and dI;t dominates any collection of I disjoint
intervals with the same upper boundary dI;t. Then we go back to the case where I = 1; and the single
dominant interval is Dt = [dt; zt] ; with dt  (1 $t) zt. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
For any t  0; the value function Vt () and the optimal quantity of high-skilled labor input M;t () must
satisfy three conditions: (i) the rst-order condition for M;t :
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;t = #

t (q)

M;t (q)
M;t
# 1 Vt+1 (q)  Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

; (61)
(ii) the Bellman equation for the monopolists problem:
Vt (q) = (1  p;t)t (q) + (1  p;t   d;t)wH;tM;t (q) + bt (q) Vt+1 (q)  Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1

+
Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1
= (1  p;t)t (q) +

1
#
  1

(1  p;t   d;t)wH;tM;t (q) + Vt+1 (q)
1 + rt+1
; (62)
where t (q) = (1   )Et (q=Qt)
 
1  ; and (iii) the market-clearing condition for private-sector researchers:
M;t 
X
q2Q
ft (q) M;t (q) = (1 $t)NH;t: (63)
To prove this proposition, it su¢ ce to show that there exists a sequence of positive real numbers f t;Ftg1t=0
such that the analytical solutions Vt (q) =  tq
 
1  and M;t (q) = Ftq
 
1  satisfy (61)-(63).
Substituting M;t (q) = Ftq
 
1  into the market-clearing condition gives
Ft
X
q2Q
ft (q) q
 
1  = FtQ
 
1  
t = M;t = (1 $t)NH;t (64)
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) Ft = (1 $t)NH;tQ
   
1  
t ; for all t:
Next, substitute the expressions for  (q; qt) ; Vt (q) and M;t (q) into (61) to get
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;t = #
 (qt)
X%t q
  # 
1  
"
Ftq
 
1  
M;t
## 1 264 t+1


 
1    1

q
 
1  
1 + rt+1
375
=
#
 (qt)
X%t Q
(1 #) 
1  
t
264 t+1


 
1    1

1 + rt+1
375 : (65)
The second line is obtained by using (64). Similarly, substitute the expressions for t (q) ;  (q; qt) ; Vt (q)
and M;t (q) into (62) to get
 t = (1  p;t) (1   )EtQ
   
1  
t +

1
#
  1

(1  p;t   d;t)wH;tFt +  t+1
1 + rt+1
(66)
= (1  p;t) (1   )EtQ
   
1  
t +

1 +
1
 (qt)
(1  #)


 
1    1

(1 $t)NH;tX%t Q
  # 
1  
t
 
 t+1
1 + rt+1

:
The second line is obtained by using (64) and (65). Equation (40) follows immediately from the above
equation. An alternative expression for  t can be obtained as follows: First, rewrite (65) as
 t+1
1 + rt+1
=
 (qt) (1  p;t   d;t)
#


 
1    1
 wH;tX %t Q  (1 #) 1  t :
Then, substitute this expression into (66) to get
 t = (1  p;t) (1   )EtQ
   
1  
t +
264(1  #) M;t +  (qt)

 
1    1
X %t Q # 1  t
375 1
#
(1  p;t   d;t)wH;tQ
   
1  
t

;
(67)
which is strictly positive for all t  0: To summarize, equations (64) and (67) show that there exists a pair of
positive real numbers,  t and Ft; such that the proposed solutions Vt (q) =  tq
 
1  and M;t (q) = Ftq
 
1  
satisfy (61)-(63) for all t. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose Assumption S is satised. Suppose % < #; = (Qt) = =Q
# 
1  
t ; with = > 0; and  (qt)  q 't ; with
 > 0: Then the subsystem for Xt and Qt can be rewritten as
Xt+1
Xt
= 1 +
1
= ($
) z't NH;tX
%
t Q
  # 
1  
t ;
Qt+1
Qt
=

1 +
1



 
1    1

(1 $) z't NH;tX%t Q
  # 
1  
t
 1  
 
;
where we have also used the assumption zt = qt for all t:Dene a transformed variable eXt  z't NH;tX%t Q  # 1  t :
Using the above equations and zt+1 = zt, we can derive a single dynamic equation in eXt; which is
eXt+1eXt =
' (1 + n)
h
1 + = 1 ($) eXti%h
1 + 
 1 

 
1    1

(1 $) eXti#
=
8><>:

'
# (1 + n)
1
#
h
1 + = 1 ($) eXti %#
1 + 
 1 

 
1    1

(1 $) eXt
9>=>;
#
: (68)
The initial value of eXt is predetermined and is given by eX0 = 0X%0 > 0 as N0 = Q0 = q0 = 1: Along any
balanced-growth path for Xt and Qt, the transformed variable eXt must be invariant over time. Conversely,
if eXt = eX for all t; then the growth rates of Xt and Qt must be constant over time. Thus, the existence
and uniqueness of BGP for Xt and Qt is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of (non-trivial) steady
state for (68). In what follows, we will focus on the dynamic equation in (68).
When eXt = 0 the growth factor in (68) is ' (1 + n) > 1: When eXt approaches positive innity, this
growth factor will converge to zero as % < #: Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists at
least one non-trivial steady state for (68). To establish uniqueness, dene a pair of functions:
N1
eXt  '# (1 + n) 1# h1 + = 1 ($) eXti %# ; (69)
N2
eXt  1 +  1   1    1 (1 $) eXt: (70)
The rst function, N1 () ; is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave as 0 <
% < #: The second function, N2 () ; is an a¢ ne function. Any steady-state value eX must satisfy
N1
eX = N2 eX : Suppose the contrary that there exists more than one non-trivial steady state
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for (68). Let eX1 and eX2 be the smallest and second smallest steady-state values, respectively. Since
N1 (0) = 
'
# (1 + n)
1
# > N2 (0) = 1; N2 () must be cutting N1 () from below at eX1 and N1 () must be
cutting N2 () from below at eX2: This means for any { 2 (0; 1) ; we have
N1

{eX1 + (1  {) eX2 < {N2 eX1+ (1  {)N2 eX2
= {N1
eX1+ (1  {)N1 eX2 ;
which contradicts the fact that N1 () is strictly concave. Hence, there exists a unique steady state
for (68). In sum, we have shown the existence of a unique eX such that (i) N1 eX = N2 eX ;
(ii) N1
eXt > N2 eXt ; whenever eXt < eX; (iii) N1 eXt < N2 eXt ; whenever eXt > eX; and (iv)
N 01
eX < N 02 eX : In addition, N1 (0) > N2 (0) :
Finally, we need to show that the unique steady state eX is globally stable. For expositional conve-
nience, rewrite (68) as eXt+1 = B eXt ; where
B
eX 
24N1
eX
N2
eX
35# eX:
The above results imply that B (0) = 0; B
eXt > eXt whenever eXt < eX; and B eXt < eXt whenevereXt > eX: The unique steady state is globally stable if the slope of B () evaluated at eX is between zero
and one. Straightforward di¤erentiation gives
B0
eX =
24N1
eX
N2
eX
35#8<:
24N 01
eX
N1
eX  
N 02
eX
N2
eX
35#eX+ 1
9=; ;
for all eX  0: In particular,
B0
eX = hN 01 eX N 02 eXi| {z }
( )
#eX
N1
eX + 1 < 1:
To show that B0
eX is strictly positive, rewrite the above expression as
B0
eX = 1
N1
eX
n
#eXN 01 eX+ (1  #)N1 eX+ # hN2 eX  eXN 02 eXio ;
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where N2
eX   eXN 02 eX = 1 due to its linearity property. Hence, B0 eX > 0: This completes the
proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose the conditions in Proposition 3 are satised. Then, in the long run, the variable 	t will be growing
at the constant rate  specied in (47). In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that the transformed
variable eXt  z't NH;tX%t Q  # 1  t will eventually converge to a unique constant value. This means, in the
long run, z't NH;tX
%
t will be growing at the same rate as Q
# 
1  
t : Hence, we have
Qt+1
Qt
=

' (1 + n)

Xt+1
Xt
% 1  # 
: (71)
Substituting (71) into (39) gives (47). In any balanced-growth equilibrium, both bct and bkt are stationary
over time which means both per-capita consumption (i.e., cH;t and cL;t) and per-capita physical capital
must be growing at the same rate as 	t: Using the Euler equation in (29), we can get
1 +  = 
1
 [1 + (1  a) r]
1
 ;
where r =  A
bk 1   : This gives a unique value of bk; which is
bk =   A (1  a)
(1 + )   [1   (1  a)]
 1
1 
> 0:
The value of bc is uniquely determined by
bc = A bk   [(1 + ) (1 + n)  (1  )]bk:
This conrms that there exists a unique pair of values
bc;bk that satises the balanced-growth condi-
tions. Finally, since cs;t and As;t grow by the factors (1 + ) and (1 + ) (1 + n) ; respectively, in every
period, the transversality condition is satised if  (1 + )1  (1 + n) < 1: For any  > 0; the assump-
tions   1 and  (1 + n) < 1 are su¢ cient to ensure that this condition is satised. This establishes
the existence and uniqueness of long-run balanced-growth equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Part (i) To establish this result, it su¢ ce to show that the unique steady-state value eX is strictly
increasing in n: Recall the two functions, N1 () and N2 () ; dened in (69) and (70). Set = =  = 1:
Note that only N1 () depends on n: To highlight this dependence, we will express this function as
N1
eX;n : By the denition of eX; we have N1 eX;n = N2 eX : Totally di¤erentiating this with
respect to eX and n gives

@
@n
h
N1
eX;ni dn =  @
@eX
h
N2
eX N1 eX;ni deX:
) d
eX
dn
=
@
@n
h
N1
eX;ni
@
@eX
h
N2
eX N1 eX;ni :
As explained in the proof of Proposition 3, the slope of N1
eX;n must be strictly less than that of
N2
eX at the steady state. Hence, the denominator of the above expression is strictly positive. It is
straightforward to show that the numerator is also strictly positive. Hence, an increase in n will raise
the value of eX: This in turn raises the long-term growth rates of Qt and Xt:
Part (ii) Rewrite the steady state condition as N1
eX;$ = N2 eX;$ : Totally di¤erentiating
this with respect to eX and $ gives
deX
d$
=
@
@$
h
N1
eX;$ N2 eX;$i
@
@eX
h
N2
eX;$ N1 eX;$i :
Again, the denominator of this expression is strictly positive. As for the numerator, we have
@
@$
h
N1
eX;$i = '# (1 + n) 1# h1 +  ($) eXi %# 1 %
#
0 ($) eX > 0;
@
@$
h
N2
eX;$i =    1    1 eX < 0:
Hence, the numerator is also strictly positive. These results show that an increase in $ will raise the
value of eX and the long-run growth rate of Xt: To see that this will also increase the long-run growth
rate of Qt; it su¢ ce to note that (45) is equivalent to (71) when eXt = eX:
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Part (iii) Using the same argument as in part (ii), we can show that an increase in  will increase the
value of eX if and only if @@ hN1 eX;i > @@ hN2 eX;i : From (44) and (45), we can get
@
@
h
N1
eX;i = '
#
N1
eX; and @
@
h
N2
eX;i =  
1   
 
1   1 (1 $) eX:
Hence, we have
@
@
h
N1
eX; N2 eX;i
=
1


'
#
h
1 +


 
1    1

(1 $) eXi   
1   
 
1  (1 $) eX
=
1


'
#
+

'
#


 
1    1

   
1   
 
1  

(1 $) eX :
This expression is strictly positive if '#


 
1    1

  1  
 
1  : But in general this expression can be
either positive or negative, hence the result in part (iii) of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7
Again consider the two functions N1 () and N2 () as dened in (69) and (70). Set = =  = 1: When
n = 0; the function N1 () becomes
N1
eXt  '# h1 +  ($) eXti %# :
Note that this does not change the fact that N1 () is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Most importantly, since 
'
# > 1; it is still the case that N1 (0) > N2 (0) = 1: Thus, the
proof of Proposition 3 remains valid.
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Appendix C: Data and Calibration
Total R&D Spending Data on R&D spending are obtained from National Patterns of R&D Resources:
2009 Data Update, which is available on the NSF website. As we mentioned in Section 2, we only consider
two types of research activities in the current study, namely (i) government-nanced basic research, and
(ii) applied research and development performed in the private sector. Thus, our measure of total R&D
expenditures is dened as the sum of three components in the actual data: (i) basic research funded by
the federal government and other governments, (ii) applied research performed by industry and paid by
either the government or industry, and (iii) development performed by industry and paid by either the
government or industry.
Employment of Researchers Total employment of researchers is dened as the sum of (i) academic
and government researchers participating in basic research, and (ii) private-sector researchers participating
in applied research and development. The data source for private-sector researchers is described in footnote
16. For the employment of academic researchers, there are three existing data sources. The rst one is
the National Center for Education Statistics. This source contains data on the number of full-time faculty
(instruction, research and public service) employed in degree-granting institutions over the period 1989-
2009. The second data source is the Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT) available
on the NSF website. This source contains data on the number of scientists and engineers (whose primary
or secondary work activity is research and development) employed in di¤erent sectors (business, academia
and government). Data are available for the years 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003 and 2006. A third data
source is the Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), which collects data on individuals who have received
a doctorate degree in a science, engineering, or health eld from a U.S. academic institution. This is the
source of the data reported in Stephan (1996, Table 2). We do not use these data because according to the
SESTAT, researchers with doctorate degree only accounted for a small fraction of all employed researchers
(e.g., 10.2 percent in 2006). Thus, focusing on these researchers alone will signicantly understate the
total quantity of labor input in research activities. None of these sources classies researchers by type of
research (basic, applied and development).
The following procedure is used to construct our proxies for ftgT

t=0 : The rst step is to estimate
the total number of researchers participating in the two research activities mentioned above for the year
2006. We use this year as our starting value because it is the most recent year in which all necessary
data are available. To approximate the number of researchers participating in government-funded basic
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research, we multiply the total number of academic and government researchers by the share of basic
research expenses in total R&D performed by these institutions. According to the SESTAT data, the
number of scientists and engineers (whose primary or secondary work activity is research and development)
employed in academia (4-year colleges and universities) and government in 2006 were 715,000 and 574,000,
respectively. These numbers were taken from Table 13 of Characteristics of Scientists and Engineers in the
United States: 2006. For the same year, basic research accounted for 71.8 percent of all R&D performed
by universities and colleges. The corresponding gure for federal and local governments was 11.2 percent.
Thus, our estimate for the number of basic researchers in 2006 is 715; 000  0:718 + 574; 000  0:112 =
577; 658: Similarly, in order to get a proxy for the number of private-sector researchers participating in
non-basic research, we multiply the total number of private-sector researchers (3.57 million in 2006) by
the percentage of applied research and development spending in total R&D performed by private rms
(96.4 percent in 2006). We then take the sum of these two proxies as the total number of researchers in
2006. This number represents 2.78 percent of total U.S. employment in 2006.
The above calculations show two things. First, researchers only account for a small fraction of total
employment in the United States. Thus, we equate the values of fnL;tgT

t=0 to the annual growth rates of
total employment over the period 1953-2009. Second, most of the researchers are employed in the private
sector (85.6 percent in 2006). Thus, we equate the values of fnH;tgT

t=0 to the annual growth rates of the
employment of R&D scientists and engineers in the private sector. Given the values of fnL;t; nH;tgT

t=0 and
the value of t in 2006, we can derive all other values of t using the following procedure. For any t > 0;
we have
t  NH;t
NH;t +NL;t
) NH;t
NL;t
=
t
1  t :
Combining this and Ns;t = (1 + ns;t 1)Ns;t 1 gives
NH;t
NL;t
=
(1 + nH;t 1)NH;t 1
(1 + nL;t 1)NL;t 1
=
t
1  t
) t
1  t =
(1 + nH;t 1) t 1
(1 + nL;t 1) (1  t 1) :
Note that once we impose the restriction nH;t = nL;t for all t  T ; we will have t = T  for all t > T :
Subsidy Rate on Private R&D The actual calculation of corporate R&D tax credit under the U.S.
federal tax code is very a complicated process. For this reason, the values of fd;tgT

t=0 in our model are
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Table A1 E¤ective R&D Tax Credit
Bloom et al. (2002) Hall (1993) Bloom et al. (2002) Hall (1993)
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
1979 0.05  1989 3.80 2.19
1980 0.05 0.0 1990 12.40 7.69
1981 5.63 3.04 1991 12.40 7.49
1982 5.63 5.05 1992 12.40 
1983 5.63 3.64 1993 12.22 
1984 5.63 4.60 1994 12.22 
1985 5.63 5.01 1995 12.22 
1986 4.57 3.11 1996 12.22 
1987 4.61 2.66 1997 12.22 
1988 4.61 3.50
only intended to capture the e¤ective subsidy rates provided by the U.S. system. To compute these
values, we follow the conceptual framework described in Bloom et al. (2002). Let Adt be the amount of
corporate income tax deduction for each dollar of R&D investment at time t; and let Act be the amount
of tax credit for each dollar of R&D investment. Then, the user cost of private R&D investment at time
t is determined by
dt 
"
1   Adt +Act
1  p;t
#
(rt + ) ;
where p;t is the corporate income tax rate at time t; rt is the real interest rate and  is the depreciation
rate of rms assets. Our goal here is to recover the values of Act using the information provided in Bloom
et al. (2002). First, the estimated values of dt for the United States over the period 1979-1997 can be
found in their Table A2. These authors assume that the real interest rate is ten percent throughout the
sample period. The corporate income tax rates that they used can be found in their Appendix A9. Since
they also include state taxes on corporate income, the values that they used are slightly di¤erent from
the ones in Figure 7. The depreciation rate that they used is a weighted average for three di¤erent types
of assets (current expenditure on R&D, buildings, and plant and machinery). Based on the information
provided on pages 6-7 in Bloom et al. (2002), we get a value of 27.94 percent for . Since private R&D
expenditures are fully deductible from corporate income tax, we set Adt = p;t: The implied values of A
c
t
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are shown in Table A1. We also compare these values to the average e¤ective R&E tax credit reported in
Hall (1993, Table 3). For years prior 1979, we assume that the subsidy rate is the same as in 1979, which
is 0.05 percent. For years after 1997, we assume that the subsidy rate has remained constant since 1997.
Before-tax Real Interest Rate The before-tax real interest rate is computed using the procedure
described in Cooley and Prescott (1995). Let YKP be the amount of income on xed private capital,
which is dened as
YKP = Unambiguous Capital Income + P  (Ambiguous Capital Income).
Unambiguous capital income refers to the sum of rental income, corporate prots and net interest.
Ambiguous capital income is the sum of proprietors income and net national product (NNP) minus
national income. The variable P is dened according to
P =
Unambiguous Capital Income +DEP
DEP - ProprietorsIncome + National Income
;
where DEP denotes consumption of xed capital, which is the di¤erence between GNP and NNP. The
before-tax rate of return (r) is then given by r = (YKP  DEP ) =KP ; where KP denotes private xed
asset. All the data involved in this computation are available from the NIPAs.
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